City University of New York (CUNY)

CUNY Academic Works
Dissertations and Theses

City College of New York

2014

Predicting North Korean Reform; Changing the North with a New
Strategy
Won Ju Kim
CUNY City College

How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/cc_etds_theses/293
Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu
This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY).
Contact: AcademicWorks@cuny.edu

Predicting North Korean Reform:
Changing the North with a New Strategy

Won Ju Kim
May 2014
Master's Thesis
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of
International Affairs at the City College of New York
Advisor: Dr. Jean Krasno

Table of Contents
Abstract
Chapter I: Introduction ....................................................................................................... 1
1. Intro .................................................................................................................... 1
2. Research Question ............................................................................................. 2
3. Methodology ...................................................................................................... 3
4. Limitations ......................................................................................................... 4
5. Thesis Statement ................................................................................................ 4
Chapter II: Literature Review ............................................................................................ 6
1. Under New Leadership ...................................................................................... 6
2. Korean War II .................................................................................................... 7
3. Reunification ...................................................................................................... 8
4. Open Economy ................................................................................................... 9
5. Status Quo ........................................................................................................ 10
6. Korean Spring .................................................................................................. 11
Chapter III: Korea ............................................................................................................ 13
1. Brief Korean History ........................................................................................ 13
2. Division of South and North ............................................................................ 18
3. Current Status - Republic of Korea .................................................................. 21
4. Current Status - Democratic People's Republic of Korea ................................ 24
Chapter IV: DPRK Issues ................................................................................................ 32
1. Nuclear Weapons ............................................................................................. 32
2. NPT & IAEA ................................................................................................... 33
3. Sanctions .......................................................................................................... 37
4. Geneva Agreed Framework & Six-Party Talks ............................................... 50
5. Human Rights Violations - Prison Camps ....................................................... 59
6. Human Rights Violations - Defectors .............................................................. 69
Chapter V: Arab Spring & North Korea .......................................................................... 81
1. Arab Spring - Most Impacted Nations ............................................................. 81
2. Synthesis & Analysis - North Korea ................................................................ 85
Chapter VI: Kaesong Industrial Zone .............................................................................. 92
1. Background ...................................................................................................... 92
2. Sunshine Policy ................................................................................................ 93

3. Issues ................................................................................................................ 95
4. Stakes & Interests ............................................................................................ 97
5. Recommendations ............................................................................................ 98
Chapter VII: Conclusion ................................................................................................ 100
Bibliography

Abstract
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) is a remarkably unique and
obstinate nation. It has firmly maintained its communist government system for over half
a century.

The country has survived through both the second and third wave of

democracy, the collapse of the Soviet Union, Chinese reform, the late 1990 famine,
which resulted in a substantially high number of deaths, and significant pressure from
both internal and external features such as United Nations sanctions. It also has revealed
its unwillingness to make any compromises by designating Kim Jong Un as the next
leader who is the grandson of the regime founder - Kim Il Sung. This research thesis,
however, argues that North Korean reform will occur in the foreseeable future. The
paper specifically reviews the Arab Spring and analyzes the factors and conditions that
caused the uprisings. It then applies these discoveries to the DPRK case. Among many
other reasons, this thesis analyzes the economic aspects - the people's desire for economic
betterment and higher living standards - as the key attributes for recent revolutionary
events. Globalization, the freedom of access to information and foreign goods across
international borders, allows people to increase their want for betterment. North Korea,
too, is affected by this global integration and outside sources are entering the nation in
various ways, such as the Internet. Its citizens interact with South Koreans daily at the
Kaesong Industrial Zone. The country is currently facing the most difficult test of its era
and this thesis argues that the regime will finally breakdown during the new
democratization movement that is being called the fourth wave of democracy.

Chapter I: Introduction
1. Intro
Korea was officially divided into two nations in the Fall of 1948. Separated by
the 38th parallel, the South formed the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the North became
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). Since the division, the ROK has
mainly focused on developing democracy and strengthening its economy. Its economy
grew very rapidly and successfully during the past sixty years, and has been utilized as an
excellent case study and economic model for many underdeveloped countries. The
DPRK, in contrast, has continuously promoted the communist doctrine and advanced its
military power. It has isolated itself from the global community, violated international
law on numerous occasions, and created a negative national image in worldwide media.
It initiated the Korean War in June 1950, which caused over 2.5 million total deaths,
including at least 1.5 million civilian lives. 1 North Korea killed and attempted to
assassinate South Korean government officials, including its presidents. It started the
nuclear weapons development program despite pressure from other nation states and
frequent requests to abandon the program. The North traded weapons of mass destruction
with various nations and exchanged illegal goods in the black market.

It recently

destroyed a ROK warship with a torpedo missile and conducted an artillery attack on a
South Korean island named Yeonpyeong. It also violates international human rights laws
and consistently puts its citizens at great risk.
It is time to change these headline stories. It is time to reform the DPRK and
establish peace on the Korean Peninsula. For the last sixty-six years, the two Koreas

1

CNN Library, "Korean War Fast Facts," CNN, July 26, 2013,
http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/28/world/asia/korean-war-fast-facts/, accessed March 2014.
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have failed to construct a firm diplomatic relationship and have been identifying each
other as an enemy. This tension has only produced damaging consequences in all social,
political, and economic aspects. South Korea, for instance, spends approximately $30
billion and 10% of its national budget on defense.2 The North uses roughly $10 billion
and 16% on defense.3 It is finally time to bring an end to this long-lasting conflict and
rewrite Korean history. To reach this goal, however, there must be a new strategy.
The United States (US), the European countries, international governmental
organizations, the ROK and the neighboring nation states have thus far implemented
different methods to improve the situation.

World leaders, including American

Presidents Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton, have visited the DPRK. There were two InterKorean Summits. There was the Six-Party Talks. The United Nations (UN) and the
European Union (EU) have applied tough sanctions on North Korea. South Korea and
the global community have shipped a large amount of food and humanitarian aid to the
North.

They have used carrot-and-stick methods to convince the country. But yet,

nothing has worked and the DPRK has remained unchanged. The Korean Peninsula is
still one of the most heavily armed regions in the globe and a war is a constant possibility.
This thesis, however, argues globalization and international commerce will serve as a
new tool to turnaround this trend and permanently build security on the Korean Peninsula
and further reunify the two Koreas.
2. Research Question

2

Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Korea, "Defense Budget Status,"
http://www.mnd.go.kr/mbshome/mbs/mnd/subview.jsp?id=mnd_010201010000, accessed March2014.
3
"North Korea Budget Amount," Korea JoongAng Daily, April 3, 2013,
http://article.joins.com/news/article/article.asp?total_id=11118873, accessed March 2014.
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For the sake of international security, peace on the Korean Peninsula and the
safety of citizens in North Korea, the primary research question that this thesis seeks to
analyze is the following: What are the key factors and conditions that initiated the Arab
Spring and whether those conditions might bring about in North Korea the possibility of
experiencing its own uprising. Is there also any new type of phenomenon to stimulate
North Korean reform?
3. Methodology
This thesis first uncovers the features that affected the Arab Spring and then relate
the findings to the DPRK. The comparative analysis method is therefore the most proper
approach and mainly utilized in the research. There were more than 21 nations involved
in the Arab Spring. The thesis primarily reviews 6 countries that had the most significant
impact: Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Syria, and Bahrain. It examines their common
reasons for revolution: authoritarianism, political corruption, weak economy, human
rights violations, and cultural change. It further evaluates what the nations were trying to
accomplish such as democracy and regime change, and how they planned to achieve
those goals including riots, protests, demonstrations, Internet activism, and selfimmolation. The youth generation and security forces played an essential role in the
rebellions and they are closely assessed as well in this paper.
The key sources for the research are academic journals, government publications,
international institution reports, non-governmental organization research materials, books,
and newspaper articles. The major researched topics are the Middle Eastern uprisings,
the affect of the Arab Spring on North Korea, and the present social, political and
economic status of the North. The research method applied was to use diverse search

3

engines to locate previously completed researches and studies by scholars and their
observations on the issues. The thesis also explores materials from South Korea since
due to the nature of the subject more research is conducted in the South. The paper
author is proficient in written and spoken Korean. The qualitative research method was
employed throughout the study. Some data and quantitative measurement are provided in
certain areas but the majority of the information and conclusions are presented in
descriptive expressions.
4. Limitation
The major obstacle of this research is limited access to DPRK information. For
the past half century, the nation has emphasized its main ideology - independence and
self-reliance - and isolated itself from the international community. It has established
diplomatic relations and trade partnerships with only a small number of countries like
China. It does not allow individuals to cross its borders easily. Foreigners enter the
nation with a large number of restrictions and risks. With the exception of diplomats,
North Korean citizens are disallowed from travelling outside the country. In a nutshell,
the North has one of the strictest closed-door foreign policies ever to exist. For these
reasons, it has been extremely difficult for scholars, students, journalists, researchers,
government officials to study the facts about the DPRK and gather enough data to make
proper judgments.

This thesis, therefore, makes arguments based on this limited

information availability.
5. Thesis Statement
After analyzing and applying the factors and conditions of the Arab Spring
revolutions to the DPRK and reviewing its recent economic interaction with the ROK,

4

this thesis concludes that North Korea is facing the most critical challenge of its era and a
reform will finally occur in the foreseeable future.

5

Chapter II: Literature Review
1. Under New Leadership
Scholars, researchers and diplomats share different perspectives on the future of
the DPRK. Some argue that the regime will collapse as other communist nations have.4
Some claimed that the status quo will prevail.5 Some contend that the nation will follow
China and gradually make changes.6 Many also believe that it is too difficult to have
predictions on North Korea. 7 As it was evidently proven by its nuclear weapon
development, the country has been hiding and lying about what is happening inside its
borders.
People are now asking how the new young leader, Kim Jong Un, will dictate his
nation's upcoming days.8 This question is particularly interesting due to his age. He was
born in 1983 and was in his late 20s when he took over the highest position. Many
individuals think that he is too young and inexperienced to lead the North. The issue is
also noteworthy since the country is under maybe the toughest sanctions that the UN has
ever imposed on a nation state. The DPRK, furthermore, is faced with historical events
like the Arab Spring and is living through the era of globalization (Lynch, 2011).9 Today,
there are no actual borders between countries. Goods, services, and, most importantly,
information are freely exchanged. Even the most secured nation, North Korea, cannot
4

Selig S. Harrison, Korean Endgame: A Strategy for Reunification and US Disengagement (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2002), 3.
5
Yun Jo Cho, The Sources of Regime Stability in North Korea: Insights from Democratization Theory
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Journal of East Asian Affairs, 2005)
6
Judith Thornton, “Benchmarking North Korea Economic Policies; The Lesson from Russia and China,” in
Conference North Korea – Guideposts for radical Economic Change, Washington, DC, February 8, 2007,
pp.2-8.
7
Christopher D. Hale, “Real Reform in North Korea?,” Asian Survey 45, no.6 (November/December
2005): 823-842.
8
Victor D. Cha and Nicholas D. Anderson, “A North Korean Spring?,” The Washington Quarterly 35, no.1
(2012): 7.
9
Mark Lynch, "The Big Think Behind the Arab Spring," Foreign Policy, November 28, 2011,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/11/28/the_big_think, accessed March 2014.
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resist this powerful trend and outside news and stories are flowing into the country.
Consequently, its citizens are beginning to discover that there is a better world outside,
and that its government has been telling lies about other nations. Foreign affairs experts,
therefore, are very curious how things will turn out under the new leadership and whether
reform will finally occur in the North.
2. Korean War II
Under the new global settings, the DPRK's future faces quite a few scenarios.
First, North Korea could cross the 38th parallel again and start a full-scale war - the
Korean War II.10 This possibility, however, is extremely unlikely. The North is well
aware of the fact that the UN and more crucially the US will engage in the military
conflict in accordance with the US-Korea Status of Forces Agreement and defend the
ROK. The DPRK knows that it cannot overpower US forces with its military capacity,
weapons of mass destruction and even nuclear warheads. Kim Jong Un and his staff
would lose everything and flee to China. The risk is too great to launch an attack and
spend the rest of their lives in a foreign country as fugitives. They know what the
consequences were for both Iraq's long-time dictator Saddam Hussein and the al-Qaeda
leader Osama bin Laden.
China's reaction to this clash will be a big question mark. China and North Korea
signed the Sino-North Korean Mutual Aid and Cooperation Friendship Treaty. Article 2
of the Treaty indicates that the two nations agree to provide assistance in case either party
is attacked by another state. The Treaty was first signed in 1961 and is renewed every
twenty years. The latest re-signing took place in 2001 and will be effective until 2021.

10

James Fearon and David Laitin, “The Two Koreas,” Stanford University Working Paper KoreasRN 1.5,
2006, p.18-25.
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The North Korean-Soviet Mutual Aid and Cooperation Friendship Treaty was also first
signed in 1961 but has been discontinued since the 1990s. China would have second
thoughts about countering the US-ROK alliance. It obviously would not want to fight a
war against its largest trading and business partner.
3. Reunification
Another improbable scenario is reunification (Kelly, 2011).11 The citizens of both
South and North Korea are desperate to reunite with their separated families and to revisit
their hometowns.

Both governments, however, are unwilling to accept such a

circumstance. The DPRK government is happy with its current situation. They are living
a high-class life and enjoying luxury goods and services, even though the majority of
their people are living in poverty. They would not give up their power and money that
easily. The ROK government wishes the North to change but sees the reunification as an
event that has to take place at a later date. There is a huge gap between the nations'
economies.

The DPRK's latest recorded gross domestic product (GDP) is $14,411

million (USD), ranked 120th in the world. The ROK's most recently recorded GDP is
ranked 15th at $1,129,598 million.

The South would be heavily impacted by the

reunification and it would have to spend an endless amount of money to finance the
reconstruction of North Korean infrastructure and economy system. This was shown by
the German reunification. West Germany somehow managed to recreate East Germany.
But, South Korea is reluctant to go through such an ordeal. China would also object to
the idea of Korean reunification. It is gaining too much by trading with the North and
solely importing its natural resources.
11

Robert Kelly, “The German-Korean Unification Parallel,” The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 23,
no. 4 (December 2011): 461, http://www.kida.re.kr/data/kjda/ 02_Robert%20Kelly.pdf, accessed March
2014.
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4. Open Economy
Some individuals think that there is still an opportunity that the DPRK might
become the next China.

Kim Jong Un would still be the supreme leader and the

government would remain in power, but they would open the economy to the
international community. This assumption is wrong as well. North Korea knows well
that the free market system, multinational trade and foreign direct investment are critical
elements for economic advancement. It attempted to undertake economic reform three
times in 1991, 2001 and 2010. Each time, it struggled undergoing an economic and
financial crisis. In 1991, Kim Il Sung was starting to lose one of his closest allies, the
Soviet Union, and the aid from the falling communist state. In response, he established
the Rajin-Sonbong special economic zone to enhance free trade. The project, however,
ended in less than ten years due to a corruption scandal which involved high ranking
DPRK government officials. In 2001, Kim Jong Il was anxious and desperate to recover
the country's economy after surviving a devastating famine. He reached out to his
neighbor states including the ROK and requested help with loans, aids, and direct
investments. The South Korean president visited Pyongyang during this time and offered
the Sunshine Policy.

This hopeful engagement, however, ended soon after the US

invaded Iraq. The North resumed its nuclear weapon development program. Recently, in
2010, Kim Jong Il tried to commence currency reform after the UN imposed a series of
strict sanctions on the state. His treasury department staff simply failed to properly
implement economic policies and worsened its financial situation by creating a higher
inflation rate. The person in charge of the mission was later executed.

9

Today, Kim Jong Un is operating the Kaesong Industrial Complex - a joint
economic project with the ROK.12 These ventures normally last a short period of time
and are progressing only on a small scale. The nation needs to generate cash flow
quickly only to maintain Kim Jong Un's spending habit. After the UN and the EU
imposed sanctions, the country's assets in foreign banks have been frozen and it can no
longer bring in foreign currencies from black market businesses. The leader also requires
the money to keep his cabinet staff loyal by continuously providing them and their
families with expensive goods. Otherwise, they would begin to consider disobeying and
overthrowing the leader. The DPRK has no intention to follow the path China took and
elect a reform that would adjust its entire economic system. It knows too well that
international trade and free market increases the chances of uprising by its dissatisfied
and starving citizens.
5. Status Quo
The DPRK future faces two possibilities and one of them is the maintenance of
the status quo. 13 Kim Jong Un would remain as the dear leader and continue his
grandfather's legacy. His son would take over the dictator position and his grandson after
that. It is like a family business and easily seen in Korean culture. The founders of ROK
conglomerates, such as LG, Samsung and Hyundai, all passed on ownership to their
descendants. One generation to the next, Kim Il Sung's philosophy and ideology would
continue to carry on.

12

Dongho Jo, “A Strategy for the Advancement of the North Korean Economy,” EAI Asia Security
Initiative Working Paper 11, April 2011, p. 14.
13
Andrei Lankov, “Staying Alive: Why North Korea Will Not Change,” Foreign Affairs 87, no. 2
(March/April 2008): 97.
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The government system would stay the same as well.14 The communist doctrine
and Juche ideology would still be the fundamental belief. The nation would continue to
strengthen its military capacity and upgrade their nuclear program and WMD
development. It would retain a very limited foreign policy and restrict international trade
and participation in the open market system. Legally, its citizens would not enjoy much
freedom, have no voting rights, and the central government would control court rulings.
The majority of its citizens would continue to live in poverty and believe that they live a
better life than the people in other countries. Global modernization would only affect the
capital city of Pyongyang. When satellites take pictures of the Korean Peninsula at night,
the South is awash in light and the North is almost completely dark. The Peninsula
would keep this image and the DPRK regime would successfully sustain the authoritarian
leadership for at least another century.
6. Korean Spring
This thesis finds the other possibility more convincing and argues that there will
soon be a North Korean case like the Arab Spring - the Korean Spring.15 The DPRK
citizens, especially the young generation, will learn from the Internet that their
government has been lying about everything, and that they could be living under better
life conditions. In this scenario, they will decide to organize a group of rebels and initiate
a revolution. They will figure that the military would play a substantial role and persuade
the young officers to take their side. With the support from the military-trained soldiers,
the rebel group will put up a fight against the nation's security forces. Some considerable
14

James L. Schoff and Yaron Eisenberg, Peace Regime Building On the Korean Peninsula: What's Next?
(Cambridge, MA: Institute for Foreign Policy Affairs, May 2009), 12.
15
Geoffrey Aronson, “How the Arab Spring Presages a Shifting World Order,” Foreign Policy, May 17,
2011, http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/05/17/
how_the_arab_spring_presages_a_shifting_world_order, accessed March 2014.
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sacrifices are required, but the group will eventually succeed in ending Kim Jong Un's era
and bring down communism in North Korea. The Internet usage in the North and the
younger generation and its involvement in the military service will thus be closely
analyzed throughout this study. There is a chance that this internal violence could force
the DPRK government to launch a full-scale war against the South. They would blame
the ROK as the primary cause of this movement. But, the government would first fully
concentrate on stopping the rebel unit and will not have enough armed personnel at a
later stage, especially without the young fighters.
The critics of this probable scenario dissent the opposite based on two valuable
points.16 One, the DPRK government system disallows such groups to gather and share
new ideas to initiate any sort of riots. The patrols closely monitor their citizens and
prevent such secret meetings. Two, the regime also controls the media and restricts
Internet usage. The objectors claim that not enough people are realizing the truth about
the outside world and events like the Arab Spring due to strict constraints. The country
even limited the travelling of its diplomats and government officials to the Arab states
while the revolutions were occurring. More individuals must be informed and educated
about the other side of the globe to form an uprising. This thesis, however, verifies that
these statements are no longer credible and circumstances have changed in North Korea
in recent years. New evidence indicates that the North will collapse within the near
future.

16

Adrian Hong, “How to Free North Koreans,” Foreign Policy, December 19, 2011,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/12/19/how_to_free_north_korea? page=0,3, accessed March
2014.
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Chapter III: Korea
1. Brief Korean History
The two Koreas share a rich history of prosperity and conflicts. Throughout the
five thousand years of Korean history, many kingdoms had their glories and failures on
the Korean Peninsula. The territorial boundary was constantly redefined due to struggles
among the different regimes present on the Peninsula. In ancient Korea, as many as six
independent states coexisted at a time. The unification was achieved by those Kingdoms
with advanced technology and a powerful army. Sometimes, an alliance with ancient
China was used to achieve unification on the Peninsula. Nevertheless the longevity of
each kingdom was always tested on its ability to fight against foreign incursions from
ancient China and especially Imperial Japan.17
During the Bronze Age, Gojoseon, the first civilization to appear in the Korean
Peninsula, emerged in 2333 B.C. The mythical figure Dangun, which means chief priest,
was credited to unite tribes living in the northern part of Korea and Manchuria. The
introduction of iron during the Gojoseon period led to the development of agriculture and
a centralized political structure, and the state became strong enough to maintain a trading
relationship with the Han Empire of China, at least until it fell to the Han (108 B.C.).
The fall of Gojoseon led to the rise of a number of states, such as Buyeo, Okjeo, Dongyea,
and the Three Hans in the northern part of the Korean Peninsula. The Jin state was
formed in the southern part of the Peninsula (300 B.C.).

These states were a

confederation of tribes and were based on the technology of iron.

17

Mark Bender, “Korean History,” Ohio State University Department of East Asian Humanities,
http://people.cohums.ohio-state.edu/bender4/eall131/EAHReadings/module02/m02korean.html, accessed
February 2014.
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With the decline of the Han, the Chinese influence gradually diminished in the
Korean Peninsula, and the Three Kingdoms, Goguryeo, Bekjae, and Shilla emerged (57
B.C. – 667 A.D.). Goguryeo, located in the northern part of the Peninsula, became the
strongest and largest state absorbing Buyeo into its territory. Bekjae and Shilla occupied
the west and east sides of the southern part of the Peninsula.

Each of the Three

Kingdoms started as a federation of different tribes as seen in earlier forms of civilization.
The common factor among the Three Kingdoms was the development of agriculture. The
dependency on rice cultivation led to the formation of a rigid social hierarchy with a
powerful ruling class. The Three Kingdoms used similar languages and shared cultural
influences from China. Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism greatly affected the social
and cultural atmosphere. During the Three Kingdoms period, Gaya emerged at the far
south end of the Korean Peninsula. However, with Bekjae and Shilla as a constant threat,
it was unable to evolve beyond a federation of tribes and eventually fell under the Unified
Shilla.
The weakening of Goguryeo, the largest and most powerful of the Three
Kingdoms, was a major milestone to the unifying of the Three Kingdoms. Shilla was
able to defeat the Gaya state, Bekjae, and Goguryeo using its alliance with the Tang
Dynasty of China (668 A.D), and became the Unified Shilla. After unification, the
centralized ruling structure was enhanced by two new practices: the appointment of a
successor during the King’s reign, and the organization of six bureaus to oversee public
affairs. The extended peace and prosperity resulted in cultural advancements, such as the
construction of a large-scale Buddhist temple, Bulguksa, and an astronomical observatory,
Chomsungdae. However, dependence on agricultural production gave much power to

14

regional warlords, and heavy taxation resulted in a series of farmer uprisings. Meanwhile,
in the northern part of the Korean Peninsula, the descendants of Goguryeo managed to
reappear in Manchuria as Balhae (698 A.D.), stretching up to the Amur River. This is
thought to be the northernmost region that ancient Koreans have historically occupied.
Balhae came to an end with the defeat of the Kitan of China (926 A.D.).
Unified Shilla declined as regional warlords claimed independence. Meanwhile,
post-Bekjae and Goguryeo appeared until Wang-goen established Goryeo (918 A.D.).
Wang-Geon unified the Korean Peninsula, and reclaimed a part of the Goguryeo territory.
The name Goryeo was derived from Goguryeo, which also became the origin for the
country name - Korea. As previous countries in the Korean Peninsula, Goryeo struggled
against constant foreign attacks from the north.

Goryeo relocated its capital city

southward as a defense strategy against the Mongols.

During this time, Tripitaka

Koreana or Palman Daejanggyung, which means 81,258 letters of Buddhist scriptures,
was created by monks whose spiritual yearning for peace led to the making of the
magnificent volume of wooden letter blocks. The treasure has been stored at the Haeinsa
Temple, a UNESCO World Heritage Site.18
Goryeo was overthrown by its general Yi Sung Gye, who successfully suppressed
the Jin Dynasty of China in Manchuria, and Japanese pirates in the south of the Peninsula.
The Yi Dynasty established Joseon in 1392.

To strengthen his power, Yi upheld

Confucianism as the national ideology as opposed to Buddhism to shed Goryeo’s
remaining influence. Civil and military officials were selected through open examination
testing on Confucian literature. As a result, national institutions for scholars and private
18

UNESCO, “Haeinsa Temple Janggyeong Panjeon, the Depositories for the Tripitaka
Koreana Woodblocks,” http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/737, accessed February 2014.
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learning academies flourished, and a new elite class well versed in Confucianism called
the Yang Ban appeared. Successful economic and agricultural reforms during the early
years improved the lives of common people, and paved the way for remarkable
advancements, such as the Korean alphabet, or Hangeul by King Sejeong. Prior to the
creation of Hangeul, all written communications were in Chinese characters, and only
those who received the proper education were literate. The phonetic-based letter system
was easier to learn and became the language of common people. During Joseon, the first
paper money was issued, and the comprehensive legal system based on the National Code,
or Gyung Gook Dae Jun, further modernized the country. The central bureaucracy of the
Yi Dynasty continued to thrive despite the rising of political factions by powerful
regional landowners. However, Joseon was not immune to foreign incursions. A series
of Japanese invasions, including the devastating attack from warlord Hideyoshi greatly
undermined Joseon. Towards the end of the 19th century, Korea refrained from all
trading and diplomatic relationships with foreign countries including Japan, US, France,
and Russia. Korea was known as the “Hermit Kingdom.” This continued until the last
empress of Joseon, Queen Min, opened the doors to foreign powers, believing that cordial
diplomatic relationship with Western powers could act as a shield against Japan.
However, after winning a battle with the Qing of China, Japan began its imperialist
agenda in the Korean Peninsula by assassinating Queen Min (1895) and abducting King
Gojong to Japan. It was the start of the Japanese colonization of Korea in 1910, the
oppression lasting 35 years.
Imperial Japan exploited natural resources and the Korean people for the further
expansion of its power under the Eulsa Treaty in 1905. Use of Korean language and

16

custom was banned, and people were forced to adopt Japanese surnames. In a desperate
effort to avoid the unfair treaty, King Gojong sent his agents to the Hague Conference,
the international peace convention held in 1907. However, Japan managed to deter the
mission, and King Gojong's attempt to plea to other countries ultimately failed. Stripped
of dignity and freedom, independence movements such as the March 1st demonstration
took place. Secret resistance activists set up a provisional Korean government, led by
Lee Seung Man in Shanghai, China. Lee Seung Man later became the first president of
South Korea. There were also organized armed forces battling against the Japanese in
Manchuria. Kim Il Sung, the founder of North Korea, was the main guerrilla leader
during this struggle. Korea regained its sovereignty with the surrender of Japan and the
end of World War II in 1945. A new type of ideological clash, however, was gradually
arising in the Korean Peninsula during this period.

17

Figure 1-1: (Top left) The Three Kingdom Period - Goguryeo, Baekjae, and Shilla, 5th
Century
Figure 1-2: (Top right) Balhae and Unified Shilla, 8th Century
Figure 1-3: (Bottom left) Goryeo, 11th Century
Figure 1-4: (Bottom right) Joseon, 15th Century
(Korean Culture & Information Service)
2. Division of South and North Korea
During the Cairo Conference in 1943 the US, United Kingdom, and China agreed
to put in military forces until the surrender of Japan. The declaration made at the
conference also acknowledged the independence of Korea. After the defeat of Japanese,
however, Korea was divided as the Soviet Union and the US had a shared interest of
preventing Japan’s potential aggression in the Korean Peninsula.

At the Malta

Conference in 1945, the US and the Soviet Union agreed to temporarily deploy its
military forces until Korea successfully established its own government. An arbitrary
line was drawn at the 38th parallel. The Soviet Union resided on the north side of the
line, while the US took on the south side of the line.
18

With an escalation of the Cold War, the Korean Peninsula became the ground for
political, military, and ideological struggles. Those who participated in the resistance
activities during Japanese colonization had different ideas about how the Korean
government should be organized after independence. The Soviet Union supported Kim Il
Sung, who envisioned a unified Korea with a communist ideology. On the South, Rhee
Seung Man, who had led the provisional government in Shanghai during the Japanese
occupation, was preparing a democratic government supported by the US. Both leaders
strongly believed that Korea should not be divided and that unification should be
achieved under one ideology.
The UN-sponsored election was held in 1948, and Rhee Seung Man was elected
as the first president of the Republic of Korea. However, supporters of Kim Il Sung did
not acknowledge the result, which resulted in the formation of the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea. In the South, political controversy aroused as President Rhee claimed
the intention of unification by force. The US, however, withdrew its military support
from South Korea to deescalate the tension building up in the Pacific area. At the time,
the US believed that the ROK should instead seek assistance from the UN. 19 Seizing the
opportunity, Kim Il Sung attacked South Korea on July 25th, 1950, to achieve his goal of
unifying Korea under the communist regime. The North Korean People’s Army (NKPA)
was backed up with tanks and artillery supplied by the Soviet Union. The betterequipped NKPA easily crushed the ROK army, pushing the frontier southward. The US
then called on the Security Council of the UN to send troops to South Korea. The NKPA,
however, was able occupy down to Busan, the port city located at the south end of the
19
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Peninsula. It was the General McArthur’s brilliant operation, a sudden attack at the port
of Incheon located west of the 38th parallel that caught NKPA off guard. Dispersed force
of NKPA was finally under control under the joint forces of ROK army and the US allies.
The frontier was moved up past north of the 38th parallel to the border of Manchuria. At
the time, a prediction of the unification of Korea under the democratic government
prevailed.
Threatened by the victory of the US Allies at its border, Communist China
intervened, taking the side of North Korea. The unexpected turn of events returned the
frontier of the Korean War to where it first started, at the 38th parallel. The divisive line
further solidified as the North Korean forces and the South Korean allies tightly held the
positions of defense. In 1951, the armistice talk began. The result was an indefinite truce
along the 38th parallel with the establishment of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) where
neither North Koreans nor South Koreans could enter. The Korean War was agreed to be
on indefinite hold in 1953.
After the end of the Korean War, the DPRK and the ROK went on separate ways.
Kim Il Sung established his own political ideology called Juche, or “self- reliance” as the
principles of government. Juche was enforced to an extent of being a political religion
and idolization of Kim Il Sung and his family.20 The idea of Juche was translated into the
three main principles - political independence, economic self-sustenance, and selfreliance in defense. Rather than being an application of Socialism or Communism, Juche
became the tool for an execution of the policies and rules that solidified Kim Il Sung’s
control over people in North Korea.
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In the South, Rhee Seung Man continued his leadership as the first president of
South Korea. However, his political repression of his opponents, such as the massacre of
Communist rebels, and his authoritarian governing style became controversial. Rhee
Seung Man attempted to amend the constitution to be re-elected solely upon popular vote.
Rhee managed to serve as the president for four consecutive terms, however, a revolution
led him to resign, and he was exiled to the US. In the following years, South Korea
underwent economic hardship and political struggles against a series of military regimes
until the 1960s.

Figure 1-5: (Left) Current map of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
Figure 1-6: (Right) Current map of the Republic of Korea
(CIA World Factbook)
3. Current Status - Republic of Korea
After the Korean War, the ROK had a GDP equivalent to that of a Third World
country, even lower than the DPRK’s figure. It took several decades for South Korea to
evolve into what it is today. During this turbulent time, the authoritarian president Park
Jung Hee came with an agenda to put South Korea on track for rapid economic
development. The former president Park had a controversial reputation for incidents of
violent suppression of civilian demonstrations. At the same time, he was credited with
21

establishing the groundwork for rebuilding from the remains of the Korean War. The
unparalleled economic progress was known as the “Miracle of the Hangang River” and
became a model for developing countries.
Today, South Korea has become the 13th largest economy in the world with a
growth rate of 2.8%.21 The labor force was comprised of 25.86 million people, mostly
engaged in industry and services sector by occupation.22 The unemployment rate was
3.4%, in 2011,23 while the population below poverty line was 16% in 2009.24 The direct
foreign investment was $275.5 billion at the end of 2012.25 The gross domestic product
(GDP) amounted to $1.666 trillion in 2013.26 Due to the limitation of natural resources,
over 50% of GDP relies on export, which was $557.3 billion in 2013. 27 The major
exporting partner countries were China, US, and Japan. 28 The composition of GDP
consisted of 58.2% in the services sectors, 39.2% in industry, and 2.6% in agriculture.29
The major export items were semiconductors, petrochemical product, petroleum products,
vessels, and machinery in 2011.30
Exports are not only limited to tangible goods. Starting from the early 1990s,
Korean pop culture products such as music, drama, and entertainers became a huge hit,
first in Asia and then, on a global scale. In 2011, the cultural export amounted to $4.2
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billion.31 The spread of Korean culture was also based on the advanced IT infrastructure.
The South has the world’s fastest average broadband speed and 39.4 million Internet
users, ranking the 11th in the world. Having the 8th largest trade volume in 2011,32 the
ROK imports as much as it exports. Imports amounted to $516.6 billion on items like
machinery, electronics, oil, steel, transport equipment, organic chemicals, and plastics.33
South Korea has a mixed legal system combining European civil law, AngloAmerican law, and Chinese classical thought. 34 Since it was created in 1948, the
Constitution underwent 5 major revisions. The last revision was dated in 1987 and
currently the South is referred to as the 6th Republic. Based on the Constitution three
institutions work as part of the checks and balances system similar to that of the US. The
President serves as the head of the Executive Branch. During earlier republic years, some
presidents exploited their powers to extend presidential terms, which led to the
constitutional changes. The Legislative power falls under the National Assembly. The
National Assembly is comprised of 300 members who are the representatives of regional
Gu districts. The judicial branch consists of the Supreme Court and the Constitutional
Court. The 13 justices are selected by the President with the consent from the National
Assembly. There are two major political parties, New Frontier Party or the Conservative,
and Democratic Party or the Liberal.
While the economic expansion was the first priority, national defense was always
an important issue for the ROK government. Since the Korean War ended in a truce,
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South Korea utilized its alliance with the US as well as its national manpower. Over 50
American army bases are installed throughout South Korea and joint military exercises
with the South army are performed annually. The ROK armed forces are comprised of
the army, navy, and air forces. Total 2.8% of GDP accounted for military expenditure
ranking the 26th place in the world.35 South Korea is also one of the two countries in the
world that requires all eligible men to serve in a military for 21 to 24 months by law.
They make up for a reserve force known as the ROK Civil Defense Corps.
4. Current Status - Democratic People's Republic of Korea
Occupying the north side of the Peninsula, the DPRK is located in a temperate
weather zone, having four distinct seasons with heavy rainfall during the summer.36 The
landscape is comprised mostly of hills and mountains. While there is 19% of arable land,
this ratio is on decline.37 Compared to the ROK, North Korea has a relatively adequate
amount of natural resources such as coal, lead, tungsten, zinc, graphite, magnetite, iron
ore, copper, gold, pyrites, salt, fluorspar, and hydropower.38 Due to poor management of
resources and deteriorated infrastructure, the North has environmental problems such as
water pollution, inadequate supplies of potable water, waterborne disease, deforestation,
soil erosion, and degradation.39
Although the DPRK government does not publish official data on its daily
activities, available information can provide a snapshot of its people and society. The
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population of North Korea was 24.5 million people in 2012 at the growth rate of 0.4%.40
The population growth rate is higher than that of South Korea, yet the actual population is
half the number of South Korea. The estimated breakdown of the population by age
groups in 2014 is as follows: 21.5% are under 14 years, 16.3% are between 15 to 24 years,
while the majority, 44% of population falls under the working age, which is 25 to 54
years.41 Some 9.7% of population is between 55 to 64 years and the rest, 9.5% is 65
years and over.42 The median age is 33.4 years, which is 7 years younger than median
age of South Korea.43 Approximately14.51 births and 9.18 deaths per 1,000 people are
estimated in 2014.44 Both rates are much higher than those of South Korea. The infant
mortality rate was 25.1 deaths per 1,000 live births in 2010. 45 Urban population is 60.3%
of total population, and the major urban area is the capital, Pyongyang, with 2.843
million people in 2011.46 The literacy rate in North Korea is 100%, which means every
person in North Korea over 15 years of age is literate.47 This may indicate that literacy of
its citizen is important for North Korean government in reinforcing its political
propaganda. Independent religious activities are forbidden. Instead, cult-like idolization
of the founder Kim Il Sung and the Kim Family is encouraged. Those expressing
opposition will be sent to the prison camps. However, to create the false impression of
having religious freedom, the government approves the existence of some religious
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groups, such as Christian and the indigenous Korean religion Chondogyo, which means
the Religion of the Heavenly Way.
The legal system of the North is a civil law system based on the Prussian model
with influences from Japanese tradition and the Communist legal theory. Although all
power is concentrated on its current leader Kim Jung Un, North Korea still has three
entities - the executive branch, legislative branch, and judicial branch. The executive
branch has absolute power demonstrated by the dictatorship of the Kim Family. Since
December 2011, the third generation of the founder, Kim Jong Un has served as the first
secretary of the Supreme People’s Assembly of Korea. Kim also holds the position of the
Chief Commander of the Korean People’s Army. The legislative branch is represented
by the Supreme People’s Assembly or Ch’oego Inmin Heoui, which is comprised of 687
members, who are selected by the ruling party. The ruling party approves a list of
candidates to be elected and North Korean citizens have to “vote.” Election results
usually go without any opposition because it actually serves as a tool for weeding out the
ideological defectors. It is interesting to note that the DPRK government requires its
citizens to go through the election process, which embodies the freedom of choice, even
if it is a fairytale. The election result, which is 100% affirmative, is used to further
validate its political regime. The judicial branch is represented by the Supreme Court or
Central Court, which consists of the chief justice and two “People’s Assessors.” Judges
are elected by the Supreme People’s Assembly for 5-year terms. Government regulations
are also reinforced at the subordinate level of courts and there are provincial, municipal,
military, and people’s courts. There is only one major political party in North Korea.
The Korean Worker’s Party, under its leader is Kim Jong Un’s control, also oversees the
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other minors parties, such as Chondoist Chongu Party and Social Democratic Party.
Although not active in the international community, North Korea belongs to some
international organizations such as the UN, the UN Educational Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO), and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
regional forum. The complete list of organizations that the North belongs to is as
follows; ARF, FAO, G-77, ICAO, ICC, ICRM, IFAD, IFRCS, IHO, IMO, IOC, IPU, ISO,
ITSO, ITU, NAM, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UNWTO, UPU, WFTU, WHO,
WIPO, and WMO.48 The DPRK is not actively involved in the international community
and its diplomatic relationships are limited to China, Russia, and Pakistan. There is no
diplomatic representation from the US. However, the Swedish embassy in Pyongyang
represents the US as consular protecting power.

In America, North Korea has a

permanent mission to the UN in New York.
After the Korean War, the North was in a better economic situation than the ROK.
Based on Kim Il Sung’s philosophy of self-reliance or Juche, the DPRK people were
encouraged to be part of the collective labor force in building the strongest nation in the
world. The imagery of North Korea being the most prosperous nation was constantly fed
to its citizen as motivation. During the early years, the sustenance of North Korea was
possible due to aid from the Soviet Russia and China. However, the continued largescale military spending slowed the development of crucial industries and improvement of
civilian life. Inadequate response to the famine in 1995 was critical and resulted in
nationwide starvation, leaving the citizens in the North in poor living conditions. Since
2002, the government has allowed private farming and small-scale farmer’s markets to
increase the agricultural output. In 2009, the government carried out the redenomination
48
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of currency, only to bring about inflation. In recent years, the DPRK has acknowledged
the importance of foreign investment for its survival. It established bilateral economic
cooperation with South Korea by establishing joint economic ventures such as the
Kaesong Industrial Zone.
The current economic standing of North Korea can be best described as deficient.
The total estimated amount of GDP was $12,385 million in 2011.49 The GDP per capita
was $506 at the growth rate of -0.1% in 2011.50 Most GDP was created from agriculture
(23.4%) and industry (47.2%) sectors, while 29.4% was from the services sector in
2012. 51 The source of GDP came from the industries of military products, machine
building, electric power, chemicals, mining of natural resources, metallurgy, textiles,
food processing, and tourism. 52 Agricultural products included rice, corn, potatoes,
soybeans, pulses, cattle, pigs, pork, and eggs.53 The total estimated labor force was 12.6
million in 2011, comprised of 71.6% of female population and 83.7% of male
population.54 Of the labor force, 35% was reported to have worked in agriculture, while
the rest worked in industry and the services sectors in 2008. 55 Export is limited but
currently it amounts to $3.954 billion in 2012, ranking 122th in the world.56 Exported
products included minerals, metallurgical products, manufactures including armaments,
textiles, agricultural and fishery products.57 Imports amounted to $4.828 billion in 2012,
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ranking 130th place in the world. 58 Imported goods were petroleum, cooking coal,
machinery and equipment, textiles, and grain.59 China and South Korea have been the
only trading partners to the North. Two third of export and import occurred with China,
while the rest of the exchange was carried out with the South.60
The DPRK provides controlled channels of information to its citizens.
Independent media is nonexistent and radios and TVs are pre-tuned to government
stations.

The Korean Worker’s Party controls and operates the Korean Central

Broadcasting Station, and state-run station, the Voice Korea. The government restricts its
citizens listening to all foreign broadcasts. The freedom house index for North Korea is
7.0 which translates to being “not free,” compared to the rating of the ROK (2.0) and the
US (1.0), which translates to being “free.”61 The main communication infrastructure is
telephone lines and there were 1.18 million main lines in use in 2011, ranking 70th place
compare to the rest of the world.62 The quality of telephone system is adequate, which is
based on nationwide fiber-optic network. Mobile cellular phone users were 1.7 million in
2012 and the technology was provided by Orascom Telecom Holding, an Egyptian
company which launched mobile service in 2008 for the Pyongyang area. 63 Intranet
exists within the North but restricted to chats, e-mails, and government approved
websites mainly used among universities and institutions.64
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The DPRK has been spending much of its national resources and human capital
on its military forces. The Korean People’s Army which is comprised of ground forces,
navy, air force, and civil security forces. According to the annual publication from the
Ministry of National Defense of South Korea there are about 1 million in the ground
forces, 60 thousand in the navy, and 110 thousand in the air force. 65 There are total 1.2
million soldiers and this number is twice as much as the number of the South soldiers.66
The International Institute for Strategic Studies revealed in 2010 that North Korea has the
4th largest army per population (49 military personnel per every 1000 people) in the
world, which demonstrates the level of concentration of armed forces.67 Approximately
22.3% of GDP was spent as military expenditure, which was $8.21 billion in 2008.68
Compare to the ROK’s military expenditure, which was $26.1 billion, the North’s
spending amount is less than one third of South Korea’s number. However, the DPRK
employs the “asymmetrical strategy,” which focuses on the weak point of the South
forces to make the most of their resources. North Korea’s asymmetrical strategy was not
considered a threat until the recent incident of sinking the ROK navy corvette Choen’an.
The North is equipped with about 70 submarines including 1,830-ton Romeo-class and
330-ton Shark-class submarines.69 Ballistic missiles are another part of the asymmetric
strategy and the firing of missiles for sake of testing is used every now and then to send a
message to South Korea and its allies.
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Table 1: Comparison between South Korea and North Korea (CIA World Factbook, UN
Data)
COUNTRY
CATEGORY

South Korea

North Korea

49,039,986 (2014 est.)

24,851,627 (2014 est.)

0.16% (2014 est.)

0.53% (2014 est.)

0-14 years

14.1% (male 3,603,943/female 3,328,634)

21.5% (male 2,709,580/female 2,628,456)

15-24 years

16.3% (male 2,041,861/female 1,997,413)

55-64 years

13.5% (male 3,515,271/female 3,113,257)
47.3% (male 11,814,872/female
11,360,962)
12.7% (male 3,012,051/female 3,081,480)

65 years and over

12.3% (male 2,570,433/female 3,639,083)

9.5% (male 826,175/female 1,590,281)

Birth Rate

8.26 births/1,000 population (2014 est.)

14.51 births/1,000 population (2014 est.)

Death Rate

6.63 deaths/1,000 population (2014 est.)

9.18 deaths/1,000 population (2014 est.)

3.93 deaths/1,000 live births

24.5 deaths/1,000 live births

83.2% of total population (2011 est.)

60.3% of total population (2011 est.)

SEOUL 9.778 million (2009 est.)
Busan 3.439 million (2009 est.)
Incheon 2.572 million (2009 est.)
Daegu 2.458 million (2009 est.)
Daejon 1.497 million (2009 est.)

PYONGYANG 2.843 million (2011 est.)

97.9% (2002)

100% (2008)

$1.12 trillion (2011 est.)

$12.4 billion (2011 est.)

$23,000 (2011 est.)

$500 (2011 est.)

2% (2012 est.)

1.3% (2012 est.)

2.6% (2013 est.)
39.2% (2013 est.)
58.2% (2013 est.)

23.4% (2012 est.)
47.2% (2012 est.)
29.4% (2012 est.)

Labor Force

25.86 million (2013 est.)

12.6 million (2012 est.)

Export

$547.9 billion (2012 est.)

$3.954 billion (2012 est.)

Population
Population Growth
Rate
Population by Age

25-54 years

People
& Society

Infant Mortality
Rate
Urban Population
Major
Urban Cities

Literacy Rate
GDP
GDP per Capita
GDP Growth Rate
GDP Breakdown
Agriculture
Industry
Services

Economy

Exporting Goods

9.7% (male 1,007,667/female 1,127,455)

minerals, metallurgical products,
manufactures (including armaments),
textiles, agricultural and fishery products

$519.6 billion (2012 est.)

$4.828 billion (2012 est.)

Importing Good

machinery, electronics and electronic
equipment, oil, steel, transport equipment,
organic chemicals, plastics

petroleum, coking coal, machinery and
equipment, textiles, grain

Freedom House
Index

2.0 / Free

7.0 / Not Free

2.8% (2008)

22.3% (2008 est.)

$26.1 billion (2008)

$8.213 billion (2008 est.)

Import

Military

semiconductors, wireless
telecommunications equipment, motor
vehicles, computers, steel, ships,
petrochemicals

44% (male 5,465,889/female 5,456,850)

Military
Expenditures as %
of GDP
Military Spending
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IV. DPRK Issues
1. Nuclear Weapons
A. Development
The DPRK initiated nuclear development in 1964. The nuclear weapon was one
way to rebuild and strengthen its military after the loss of the Korean War. The nation
discovered uranium deposits in the Yongbyon area and assembled the first nuclear
research center. The set up was helped by the Soviet Union. So far, there have been a
total of three nuclear tests in 2006, 2009 and 2013. There have also been ballistic missile
tests in the same years. The missiles are capable of carrying nuclear bombs to longdistance destinations. Despite a significant amount of pressure from the international
community, North Korea never gave up its desire to obtain nuclear weapons. There have
been pauses to the process followed up by a series of negotiations. Its ultimate goal,
however, has always been to become a nuclear state.70
B. The Need
The DPRK wants nuclear weapons for two specific reasons. One, the arsenals
provide the nation with guaranteed security. Throughout the entire history of the world,
no nuclear state has ever been attacked by another nation. North Korea often argues that
Iraq would have not been invaded by the US if it carried nuclear weapons. 71 It is afraid
that it could be the next Iraq. The North wishes to become a nuclear weapon state and
protect and defend itself permanently from countries that possess not only nuclear
weapons, but also powerful military forces.
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The second reason is because the weapons give the DPRK great bargaining power.
North Korea presented the nuclear card during negotiations to receive economic benefits
from other states. The nuclear development has continuously brought in luxury goods for
the leader, the Kim Family, living expenses for the government officials, and rice for the
civilians.

In return, it was obligated to terminate the program.

Nuclear weapons,

therefore, serve as a huge bargaining chip against nations that do not want to see North
Korea as a nuclear state such as Japan, the US, and the ROK.72
C. Current Status
There is one question that must be answered before moving forward. How far has
the DPRK developed its nuclear weapons program? It seems like no one has the correct
response to this puzzle except North Korea. The question is important because it can
identify the North as a nuclear state. There is also a difference between a nuclear
development program and nuclear weapons development. The former program is aimed
more towards generating nuclear energy. It is necessary to find out precisely which area
North Korea is presently concentrating on.
2. NPT & IAEA
A. Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
a. The Treaty
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was elected on
July 1, 1968 and went into effect on March 5, 1970. The overall purpose was to avoid a
nuclear war and the great danger it could present to the general public. After the World
War II and during the Cold War, the number one priority of each state was national
security. Most countries desired to achieve this goal with a nuclear weapon. The United
72
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Nations (UN) disliked the idea and wished to stop the spread of nuclear weapons and
nuclear technology through a legally binding multilateral commitment. The movement
was led by so-called Depository Governments, consisting of Russia, Northern Island, the
United States, and the United Kingdom.
Under the agreement, countries with nuclear weapons are obligated to discontinue
further development, countries without such weapons should not attempt to acquire them,
and all countries have the right to obtain peaceful nuclear energy. These three are the core
concepts of the Treaty. Each party is heavily monitored by the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) for their cooperation to the Treaty and strict compliance to the
conditions.73 The Treaty also upholds the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty, which prohibits
all nuclear weapons tests (in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water) except
underground.
On May 11, 2005, the Treaty was extended indefinitely. A total of one hundred
ninety countries have joined the Treaty.

The countries include the five permanent

members of the UN Security Council (Council): China, Russia, France, the United States,
and the United Kingdom. Some notable countries that are non-parties to the Treaty are
India, Israel, Pakistan, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). The
first three never signed the agreement and the DPRK withdrew in 2003.
b. Articles
There are eleven articles in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Some of them are worth
examining. Article I fosters nuclear-weapon states not to transfer nuclear explosive
devices to non-nuclear-weapon states or help them manufacture nuclear weapons. Article
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II commands non-nuclear-weapon states not to receive any nuclear explosive devices or
seek assistance to produce nuclear weapons. Article III demands all parties to fulfill the
IAEA’s safeguard system. This clause is further explained in Article IV, which permits
countries to function research, production and use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.
The article also authorizes the exchange of scientific and technological information and
materials for peaceful means.
Article VI commands nuclear disarmament and complete cessation of nuclear
weapon manufacture. Article VII promotes regional treaties that confirm the territory as
a denuclearized zone. Article VIII requests the parties to hold a conference every five
years to ensure the operation of the NPT. Article IX defines a nuclear-weapon state as a
country that possessed nuclear explosive devices prior to January 1, 1967. Lastly, Article
X gives the parties their right to withdraw from the Treaty with three months advance
notice served to all other countries and the UN Security Council.
c. DPRK
On January 10, 2003, the DPRK declared that it was withdrawing from the NonProliferation Treaty and was no longer bound to the Safeguard Agreement it made with
the IAEA. North Korea joined the Treaty in 1985 as a non-nuclear-weapon state and
became the first country ever to pull out from the pact. The North had once in 1993
stated its desire to remove itself from the NPT regime. The US, however, engaged in a
bilateral negotiation with the DPRK and enforced the country to change the plan just days
before the withdrawal went into effect. 74 The negotiation involved a promise from
Washington to supply aid including oil shipments.
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The withdrawal was chiefly due to the 9/11 terrorists attacks and US invasion of
Iraq. US President George W. Bush identified North Korea as an axis of evil, and US
diplomacy towards the North was hostile. The DPRK asserted that it felt threatened and
saw a possible American military attack. It said that it had to breach the disarmament
agreement and strengthen its national security. Under the international customary law
doctrine, North Korea was expected to fulfill the good faith requirement and prove that
the claimed US aggression put the country in actual danger. The Non-Proliferation
Treaty, however, did not specify exact standards to determine that a state proceeded in
good faith.
B. IAEA
a. Organization
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was founded in 1957. The
IAEA's core theme is famously known as "Atoms for Peace."75 Its main areas of works
in the nuclear field are safety and security, science and technology, and safeguards and
verification. The Agency is an independent international organization and runs within
the UN family. It reports to the UN General Assembly annually and the Security Council
on special occasions when it recognizes threats to global peace and security.
The IAEA is headquartered in Vienna, Austria. It has regional offices in Tokyo,
Geneva, Toronto, and New York. It also has research centers and scientific laboratories in
Italy and Monaco. The Agency hires over 2,300 professionals and is led by Director
General Yukiya Amano, a Japanese native who served at the Japanese Foreign Ministry
for over thirty years. Its financial resources are generated from the regular budget and
voluntary contributions.
75
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b. Duties
As of November 2012, the IAEA has one hundred fifty eight member states. It
supports its members in five distinct nuclear subjects. The Agency's Department of
Nuclear Sciences and Applications helps countries apply nuclear techniques in
agriculture, human health, water resource management, marine environment and
industrial applications. Its Department of Nuclear Energy promotes the safe use of
nuclear power. The Department of Nuclear Safety and Security works to prevent the
harmful effects and possible damage of ionizing radiation on human beings and the
environment. One of the IAEA's most important sectors, the Department of Safeguards,
relies on its inspectors to end the increase of nuclear arsenals. Lastly, the Department of
Technical Cooperation assists countries in enhancing nuclear technology.
c. North Korea
On January 30, 1992, the DPRK signed an agreement with the IAEA in Vienna,
Austria. The agreement was largely based on the three focal features of the NPT. North
Korea consented not to build nuclear bombs and to attain them from another state. It had
to permit the IAEA personnel to inspect the facilities and show that no development
existed. The country was entitled to gain technology for nuclear power. The agreement
was thirty pages long and enclosed ninety-eight articles. Every article was extremely
precise and organized in a very detailed manner.
3. Sanctions
A. Sanction Types
a. Asset Freeze
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There are a number of sanctions imposed on the DPRK. Freezing of funds and
economic resources is the major one. Both organizations, the UN and the EU, designed a
list called 'restrictions on admission'. The list contains names of individuals and 35
entities that international banks and financial institutions should not do business with.76
From time to time, the organizations also request that the banks and institutions freeze the
accounts that belong to North Korea, so that the nation is restricted from getting free
access to its capital and funds that are linked to its nuclear program. The other idea is to
also stop its debt defaults and illicit activities including counterfeiting currency and
laundering money. If the banks and financial institutions did not follow these instructions,
the organizations demanded the national governments to close down the institutions. The
banks and institutions are exempt from the regulation if they see the money is spent on
humanitarian and development purposes or find clear evidence that the resources are not
related to proliferation objectives.
b. Financial Support
International banks and financial institutions are prohibited from offering
financial assistance and concessional loans to the North. The UN and EU member states
also must closely watch the DPRK banks that are located within their territories. This
monitoring includes all payment records and transactions that are suspected to contribute
to the country's nuclear weapon programs, as well as ballistic missile and weapons of
mass destruction programs. North Korea cannot open new banks or branches in the
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member states. Its banks cannot establish joint ventures and take ownership interest in
global banks. International banks also cannot start businesses in the North.
c. Export & Import Restrictions
Any kind of arms trading with the DPRK is limited. This includes not only the
goods or equipment but also technology that could be utilized to develop nuclear and
other weaponries. Iran is one of the biggest trading partners of North Korea in terms of
armory. Both nations also sell military products to other countries. They seem to find
ways to make sales in the black market. The UN and the EU member states cannot
export gold, diamonds, precious metals, or other luxury products to North Korea. The
items are largely wanted by the upper-class citizens of the North. Both organization
sanctions, however, do not specify exactly which items are defined as luxury goods. The
exemption rule applies here as well and export items are qualified as long as they are for
humanitarian aid.
d. Shipping & Cargo Inspections
Shipping and air cargoes are a crucial portion of the DPRK economy. This
inspection requirement therefore impacts the nation considerably. It is prohibited to sell,
operate, lease, and insure North Korean vessels. The member states have a right to
inspect any North Korean ship if they have reasonable grounds to believe that the ship
carries suspected items.
inspection.

The vessel can be directed to the nearest port for careful

The North airline company must give pre-arrival and pre-departure

information. If vessels or airline carriers do not cooperate, the member states do not
allow them to dock or land in their territories. The transportation companies of the
member states also do not attempt to deliver the prohibited items for the nation.
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E. Restrictions on Admission & Residence
The UN and the EU member states do not allow entrance of DPRK people who
are related to its weapon development practice. This includes non-DPRK citizens who
get paid and work under direction of the North Korea government. This also includes
diplomats of the North and the member states can reject based on clear evidence that the
envoys are working to advance the weaponry. The UN and the EU lists contain 29
individuals and these people are banned from residing in the member states as well.
6. Energy & Other Restrictive Measures
Teaching and training the DPRK nationals who could support the military system
is another notable sanction.

Universities and educational institutions must carefully

select its students to avoid any scientists and engineers who might help the weapon
development in North Korea.
Both the UN and EU do not consider energy as one of the constraints imposed on
the North. Many experts believe that this should be included in the list since the nation is
extremely vulnerable in this field and frequently experience energy shortages. China is
the largest importer of energy to the North. It would be difficult to break this relationship.
But, if the UN and the EU controls the energy trading to the DPRK, they would have a
huge bargaining chip and would be able to easily bring the country to the Six-Party
Talk.77
B. UN Security Council Resolutions
a. Resolution 825 (1993)
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There are seven key UN Security Council resolutions that review North Korean
issues. The first one the Security Council discussed was the Resolution 825 on May 11,
1993. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK delivered a written notification
explaining its intention to withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons.

It further notified its unwillingness to continue cooperating with the

International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards agreement. It did not offer specific
reasons for the withdrawal.
The Security Council was very concerned about the letter. Until that point, North
Korea had failed to fully comply with the Treaty and the IAEA could not completely
inspect and verify any existence of nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices. The
Council encouraged the IAEA and all the Security Council members to influence the
DPRK to terminate the notice and reaffirm its commitment to the safeguards agreement.78
b. Resolution 1695 (2006)
The Council adopted Resolution 1695 on July 15, 2006 and soon after the DPRK
tested a series of ballistic missiles.

The action surprised most member states.

In

September 2005, the Six Party Talks made a joint statement that North Korea plans to
abandon all existing nuclear weapons and programs and return to the Non-Proliferation
Treaty and the IAEA safeguards agreement. (The Six Party Talks was held for the fourth
time in Beijing, China with participating diplomats from China, Japan, North and South
Korea, Russia, and the United States.)79 In return, the parties promised to provide energy
and economic assistance to the DPRK.
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The majority of the members condemned North Korea and agreed that the
launches constituted a clear threat to international peace and security.

Japan was

especially displeased with the fact that there was no adequate advance notice and the
missiles landed near its territorial sea. China and Russia, on the other hand, took the
neutral stance and insisted that any aggressive reaction would aggravate tension and the
situation should be resolved through dialogue and negotiations. The two nations are
usually very cautious when dealing with matters regarding the DPRK, because of their
economic ties with the country.80 The spokesman of North Korea argued that the test was
perfectly justified and conducted as a part of routine military exercises to increase its
capacity for self-defense.
The Council sent a strong message to the DPRK and urged its immediate return to
the Six Part Talks without any preconditions. The Council members also decided to
strictly prevent the transfer of missiles or missile-related equipment and technology to
North Korea and the procurement of the same materials from the nation, as well as the
movement of any financial resources that aims to support its missile or weapons of mass
destruction programs.81
c. Resolution 1718 (2006)
Just three month after the missile launch, the Security Council re-gathered on
October 14, 2006 to talk about North Korea. This time the main topic was even more
devastating – nuclear testing. On October 3rd, the DPRK foreign affairs representative
made a statement of a possible nuclear testing. The President of the Security Council
80
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soon responded to the announcement and warned that the test, if carried out, would bring
serious consequences. Nonetheless, the North performed the test on October 9th.
Acting under the United Nations Charter Chapter VII Article 41, the Council on
this occasion chose to impose sanctions on North Korea. The article notes that, when a
state causes harm to worldwide peace, the Council may select, as an alternative to the use
of armed force, certain measures to resist the country’s inappropriate actions. 82 The
measures may well be economic restrictions.
The Council prohibited all member states to maintain trade relations with the
DPRK. It requested multinational financial institutions to freeze North Korean assets.
There were, in addition, travel bans to the country and permission to inspect North
Korean shipping cargoes. The Council emphasized that the constraints had exemptions
and should not affect humanitarian needs. It also established a committee to analyze the
effectiveness of the sanctions and to make adjustments and toughen the restraints if
necessary. China again acted out of self-interest and had objection to the right to search
clause.
d. Resolution 1874 (2009)
The DPRK launched another missile on April 13, 2009. The President of the
Security Council made a statement that North Korea should avoid firing additional
missiles and comply with Resolution 1718.83 On May 25th, the North conducted extra
nuclear tests. Resolution 1874 was formed in response on June 12th. The resolution was
an intensified version of Resolution 1718.

The goal was to tighten the sanctions

proposed in 1718.
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Resolution 1874 allowed the member states to destroy the DPRK cargoes and
vessels after careful inspection or in case there were reasonable grounds to believe that
the shipments may contain nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons or other WMD.
The resolution forbade any grants and financial assistance or concessional loans to North
Korea, except for developmental aid that directly benefits civilian needs. It created the
Panel of Experts whose sole objective was to assist the Committee, which was set up
during Resolution 1718, and to evaluate whether the sanctions were working properly. It
also advised the North to join the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.84
e. Recent Resolutions
Following 1874, there were six more resolutions that managed the DPRK
problems: Resolution 1928 in June 2010, Resolution 1985 in June 2011, Resolution 2050
in June 2012, Resolution 2087 in 2013, Resolution 2094 in 2013, and Resolution 2141 in
2014. Resolution 2087 and 2094 condemned the recent missile launch and nuclear test,
and the other three resolutions extended the mandate of the Expert Panel, as it was
designed to operate on an annual basis. The panel was required to oversee the status and
file reports with their findings and recommendations.
C. EU Sanctions
Sanctions have become the European Union's popular foreign-policy tool. The
EU is generally known as a soft power organization.

It has been, however, very

aggressive with its sanctions. The EU currently forces sanctions on 26 nations and some
on particular terrorist groups, business entities and individuals. The total number of
sanctions increased from 22 in 2010 to 69 in 2011.85 Most sanctions are directed at Syria,

84
85

Ibid.
David Casa, David Casa, "Imposing EU Sanctions on North Korea."

44

Iran, Libya, Burma, and the DPRK. The rise of sanction implementation indicates that
the EU is now more involved in world affairs than previous years. The organization has
recently been updating the old sanctions to fit today's environment.
The increase also deleted the soft image of the EU. It uses restrictions to cause
damages to the target and prevent it from taking a certain action and follow the common
international norm. The targeted country or group usually violates the value and the
mission of the EU and the security of the global community. The first one is called
'democracy sanctions' and the latter is named 'security sanctions'. The EU applies the
democracy sanctions when nations violate international human rights or when countries
should adopt more of democratic governance. For example, the EU imposed sanctions
on Uzbekistan following the Andijan massacre.

It also has relied on the security

sanctions to discourage actions that could cause serious consequences in the worldwide
community. North Korean weapon development is the perfect case.
The EU sanctions on the North go hand-in-hand with the UN Security Council
Resolutions. They are both very identical to one another. The EU sanctions frequently
mentions the UNSC Resolutions and pretty much follows the UN Resolutions. The major
difference is the listed individuals and entities that the member states should be aware of
and should not do business with unless the matters are related to humanitarian aid. The
table below lists all EU constraints imposed on the DPRK. They all deal with armory
and are categorized as security sanctions.

Table 2: EU Sanctions on North Korea (European Union)
Sanction Title
Council Common
Position
Council Regulation
Commission

Sanction Number

Date

Cause

Type

2006/795/CFSP

11/20/2006

Missile Launch

New

329/2007
117/2008

03/27/2007
01/28/2008

Nuclear Test
Nuclear Test

New
Amendment
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Regulation
Commission
Regulation
Council Common
Position
Commission
Regulation

329/2007
Amendment
329/2007
Amendment
2006/795/CFSP
Amendment
329/2007
Amendment
329/2007
Amendment
2006/795/CFSP
Amendment
329/2007
Amendment
329/2007
Amendment
2006/795/CFSP
Amendment
2010/800/CFSP

389/2009

05/12/2009

Nuclear Test

2009/573/CFSP

07/27/2009

New Nuclear Test

689/2009

07/29/2009

Nuclear Test

Council Regulation

1283/2009

12/22/2009

Nuclear Test

Council Decision

2009/1002/CFSP

12/22/2009

Nuclear Test /
Missile Launch

Council Regulation

329/2007

06/29/2010

Nuclear Test

Commission
Regulation

1251/2010

12/22/2010

Nuclear Test

Council Decision

2010/800/CFSP

12/22/2010

Council Decision

2011/860/CFSP

12/19/2011

Commission
Implementing
Regulation

1355/2011

12/20/11

Nuclear Test

Amendment
329/2007

Council Decision

2013/88/CFSP

02/18/2013

New Nuclear Test
/ New Missile
Launch

Amendment
2010/800/CFSP

Commission
Implementing
Regulation

137/2013

02/18/2013

Nuclear Test

Amendment
329/2007

Council Regulation

296/2013

03/26/2013

Nuclear Test

Amendment
329/2007

Commission
Implementing
Regulation

370/2013

04/22/2013

Nuclear Test

Amendment
329/2007

Nuclear Test /
Missile Launch
Nuclear Test /
Missile Launch

C. Effectiveness of Sanctions
The number of sanctions for the UN and the EU is continually growing. The
aftermath of implementation is, however, the total opposite story. It is hard to measure
the effectiveness of sanctions and so little has been done to evaluate the sanctions. Some
research and studies have been conducted in academia, but the EU and other international
organizations have not done enough to calculate the effectiveness of sanctions they
imposed. The academia has often recommended enhanced planning, monitoring and
reporting. The cooperation and coordination among sanction committees, expert panels,
and monitoring bodies are another key element. There is also a need of a sanction
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coordinator and a special advisor. The EU, however, does not have this system in place.
Monitoring is done most of time by the general law-enforcement agencies of the member
states.

It is thus difficult to conclude that the sanctions are reaching the intended

objectives. They are for sure causing damages, but many steps have to be taken in order
to be certain that the sanctions affect the right target.
The success of a sanction should not be judged based on its impact on the
economy of the targeted state. Instead it should be measured based on the state's change
in behavior. The EU sanctions on the DPRK have affected the country by making it lose
millions of dollars.

The sanctions, however, have failed to finish the weapon

development. The intended nation must know that its compliance would lift the sanctions.
But, this goal is almost impossible to accomplish since many different organizations
employ separate sanctions on that particular state. 86

It is therefore important to unify

sanctions among the global institutions and nations.

The constraints are also too

inflexible. When there is a necessary for amendment of sanctions, it is often too complex
to make changes. Sanctions must also be accompanied by diplomacy. The UN and the
EU cannot impose sanctions on North Korea and leave out their foreign relations
responsibilities. The organizations must continually attempt to put the North into a
negotiating position.
Sanctions to freeze foreign bank accounts are being imposed as smart sanctions.87
This way the economic constraints would not affect the general public. But it is uncertain
whether the smart sanctions are working properly and not negatively influencing the
citizens. No nation and global institution can obtain accurate data from North Korea to
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make this judgment. A recent study found that only one third of sanctions are operating
efficiently. While another stated that almost all sanctions do not reach the intended
objectives. These studies are inaccurate for the same reason: It is not easy to gain access
to the DPRK information system and gather the necessary data to draw up an analysis.
Some claim that there may be no data available but there may certainly be reactions. And
they believe such reactions can replace data and give feedback. In order to make the
right decision, however, it is obvious that the data must be accurate and abundant.
Each state has its own distinct interests and that is the norm of the international
relations. China, however, is too often a barrier when the international community tries
to utilize sanctions on North Korea. 88 China has a close relationship with the North.
Their relations go back to the Korean War. They fought together against the ROK and
the US. China also wishes to take advantage of their trading alliance with the DPRK.
Currently, China remains the sole commercial partner of North Korea. The nation is
constantly creating problems by disagreeing with the UN and the EU sanctions and
almost always taking the side of the North.
D. Sanction Monitoring
a. Unification
The most necessary change that must be made is monitoring of the
implementation and impact of EU sanctions. Again, the EU presently has no sanction
monitoring system in place. It is also true that each member state has different opinions
on imposing sanctions and different levels of monitoring capability. Some members
cannot afford the time, effort and funding on sanction monitoring. So, it is time to put the
self-interest of each state aside and unify the common EU sanction monitoring practice.
88
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To this date, the organization should impose only sanctions that can be monitored.
Otherwise, the restraints that are not monitored may bring undesired results back to the
EU. So, in a nutshell, the EU needs to customize, target and evaluate all of its sanctions.
b. Realistic Sanctions
The EU must set goals that both the institution and the targeted nation can both
reach. In other words, the EU cannot ask too much from the country. The request must
be something that the state can fulfill. Sanctions are another tool for negotiation. When
each negotiating party is requiring too much from the opposite end, the deal cannot be
made. The restraints cannot be too broad either. The EU must suggest clearly what it
wants the target nation to do. In short, it must set realistic goals. The DPRK, for instance,
will not bother with something it cannot accomplish.
c. Reward for Compliance
A study points out that a threat to employ further sanctions on a nation does less
good than a promise to loosen or suspend the existing ones. It is therefore better to go
with a large sanction package that contains detailed description of each sanction than to
start with a small one and keep on adding on to the list. There has to be a rewards
program. And, the target country must understand how to take advantage of the program.
It must be aware with the fulfillments and their rewards.
d. Communication
It is difficult in the case of the DPRK, but the EU must try to communicate with
the public of the target state. It should explain the reasons for the imposition of sanctions
and the nature of sanctions and the conditions attached to them. This is because the
citizens can force the government to comply with the requests. The EU would explain to
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the people that the consequences of its government’s actions. It must clearly specify
what the conditions are.
4. 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework & Six Party Talks
A. Agreed Framework
a. Background
The Agreed Framework (Framework) was adopted in Geneva on October 21,
1994, after a few months of bilateral meetings between the US and the DPRK. The
former American President Jimmy Carter began the first discussion with North Korea
during his trip to the nation's capital, Pyongyang. President Carter met with its leader
Kim Il Sung and opened diplomatic negotiations to resolve the North Korean nuclear
crisis. The following series of encounters were difficult but highly valuable as both sides
reached an accord to create the nuclear-weapon-free-zone on the Korean Peninsula. The
North further consented to following the IAEA's Safeguards Agreement and its
requirement for peaceful use of nuclear energy.
b. Agreements
The Framework consists of four articles. The first one indicates that the DPRK's
graphite-moderated reactors and related complexes will be replaced by light-water reactor
(LWR) power plants.

The US should help organize an international consortium to

finance this project. America also agreed to arrange interim energy alternatives and
provide heavy oil until the completion of the LWR units.
The second article specifies that the two nations will form political and economic
relations. They should reduce barriers to trade and investment including controls on
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telecommunication services and financial transactions. Furthermore, they planned to
open an embassy in each other's respective capital cities.
Pursuant to Article Three, the DPRK was required to maintain peace and security
on the Korean Peninsula. In return, the US assured not to use nuclear weapons against
North Korea. In Article IV, the North pledged to remain as a member of the IAEA,
rejoin the NPT and accept the Safeguards Agreement which included facility inspections.
c. Results
Some international affairs experts criticize the US for being too soft with the
Framework and yielding too much to the DPRK.89 Most people, however, believe that
the agreement produced significant outcomes for the two parties and the international
community. Most notably, America was able to put together a global consortium and
supply the DPRK with two LWRs while successfully delivering heavy oil for alternative
energy prior to the construction of the reactors. This large consortium project was
managed by the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO).

In

March 1995 national representatives of Japan, the US, and the ROK gathered in New
York City to kick off the KEDO. The main priority of the KEDO, an international nonprofit organization, was to efficiently execute Article I of the Framework. South Korea
also played an important role in the project as one of its businesses, the Korean Electric
Power Corp., was selected as the main contractor.
Although there were some delays, America productively carried out the other
Articles. The Framework was effective for several years. The US and the DPRK kept a
peaceful relationship and were heading towards a positive direction. The aggressive
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foreign policy by the Bush administration and the terrorist attacks in 2001, however,
facilitated a drastic change and caused North Korea to reconsider the nuclear
development issue.
B. Six-Party Talks
a. Background
Soon after the US invasion of Iraq, the American Ambassador to the ROK
Thomas Hubbard affirmed that the US policy towards the DPRK would be dissimilar to
the Iraq case. Such verification eased the growing intensity between the two nations, and
North Korea showed its interest in founding new multilateral meetings. China, America,
and the North met in Beijing in April 2003 and formulated the trilateral talks. The US
asked China to persuade the DPRK to dismantle the nuclear weapons system. North
Korea desired a legally binding non-aggression pact with America in exchange for the
disarmament. The parties could not come up with a settlement, but approved to further
extend the meetings and also demanded involvement of other major parties including the
ROK, Japan and Russia. This was the start of the Six-Party Talks which necessitated
long-lasting and painstaking negotiations with the most difficult and unpredictable nation
around the globe. The Six-Party Talks began in August 2003 and ended in September
2007, consisting of six total rounds of discussions and 11 separate meeting phases. They
all took place in Beijing.
b. Main Contentions
The primary topic was the DPRK nuclear weapons advancement. The main
participants were the US and North Korea. The North wished to reconstruct diplomatic
relations with America and receive economic rewards for its disarmament. Specifically,
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the DPRK first needed the US and President Bush to conclude the hard-line policy
towards the nation. Second, it sought a legally binding non-aggression treaty that could
guarantee security from a possible American attack. Lastly, the country would invite the
IAEA inspectors if the conditions were satisfied. Unlike the Clinton era, however, the
US was indecisive with its reactions to the DPRK's verifiable and irreversible
disarmament. It could not trust the nation and did not take the promises seriously based
on the previous deceptive behaviors of the North.90
c. Parties
- China
There were six nations involved in the gathering. Each country participated with
different interests and reasons. China was the host of the Six-Party Talks as all meetings
occurred in Beijing. It also acted as a mediator since it had close political relations with
the DPRK. It had developed economic ties with the nation and was a rare trading partner.
It also provided North Korea with an enormous amount of humanitarian and energy
assistance. Another cause was its intention to raise its power in the Northeast Asia region.
China consistently wished to reduce the American presence and military influence in the
area. One way to accomplish this goal was to establish peace on the Korean Peninsula
which could result in withdrawal of American troops from the ROK and Japan. It also
wanted to prevent further development of the US-Japan military coalition. Both China
and Japan continuously desired its own military dominance in this territory.
China needed a stable and peaceful neighborhood during its modernization
process. The political stability in Northeast Asia thus was a vital matter for its economic
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enhancement. China also had a crucial commercial relationship with the ROK as the
advanced technology imports from South Korea were critical to China's long-term
economic prosperity. Finally, the number of North Korean defectors was constantly
rising, and the issue was a concern to a nation which was already overcrowded. In a
nutshell, China was committed to helping the North but not to the extent where it had to
sacrifice its own political interests and economic needs.
- DPRK
North Korea was seeking to achieve three objectives from the Six-Party Talks.
The largest reason the North had to acquire nuclear arsenals was for national security. If
the nation had to give up its weapons, it needed to secure a guaranteed non-aggression
pact with the US. It wanted to complete this deal at the Six-Party Talks. Energy was on
the agenda. The country needed a continuous supply of oil and additional constructions
of LWRs. Third, economic incentives were also an important negotiating term. The
DPRK suffered multiple famines during the last two decades and lost a great portion of
its population due to food shortage and poverty. North Korea was desperate to receive
economic aid from the global community.
- Japan
The DPRK did not wish Japan to join the Six-Party Talks. They never built good
relations due to Japan's occupancy of Korea for over three decades. In fact, numerous
North Korean leaders fought against Japanese during the colonial period. Not only did
the US, however, push for Japan's participation but also Japan had a massive assistance
package that the DPRK could not ignore. The number one priority for Japan during the
meetings was to return its citizens who had been abducted by North Korea. Over the
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years, the North kidnapped citizens of other nation states to obtain information and train
its diplomats and secret agents (spies) before sending them abroad. This abduction issue
frequently disturbed the progress of the Six-Party Talks. Japan desired to settle the
problem before moving onto any negotiation, and the subject matter seemed to be of too
little connection to the DPRK's disarmament. The Japanese economic impact, however,
was too great, and the success of the Talks depended heavily on Japan's financial
contributions.

Secondly, security was a huge concern to Japan.

North Korea was

prepared to launch countless long-distance missiles targeted at Japan's largest cities.
Japan also worried that China might gain too much power in the region, which could
reduce its status and control in the area.
- Russia
Russia's interest to join the Six-Party Talks was the most straightforward one.
Firstly, the nation wanted its businesses to become the primary contractor for the
construction of nuclear power plants and other related facilities in the DPRK. Secondly,
it wished to continuously utilize North Korean territory as the main trade route with the
ROK.

This railroad export and import route saved tremendous amounts of money

compared to airways and shipment cargo deliveries.
- ROK
The ROK's intentions were pretty obvious. It needed to create stability on the
Korean Peninsula.

Too often, foreign financial institutions were hesitant to make

investments in South Korea because of the nuclear dilemma.

Many multinational

corporations also left Seoul over the years for the same reason. In addition, the fall of the
Berlin Wall presented the South with hope and possibility for its own unification. For the
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past decade, the ROK policy on the DPRK has been the use of economic engagement to
reduce tensions and induce reforms. Two presidential summits held in Pyongyang and
the recent construction of Kaesong Industrial Zone may bring the impossible dream into
fruition. South Korea must keep on knocking on the door to find the right moment to
unify with the North under mutually agreeable conditions.
- US
For a number of years, the US had attempted to prevent the proliferation of
nuclear technology and materials to both nation states and non-state actors. This effort
has been carried out not only in the Northeast Asia region but also throughout the world.
Each case required distinguished negotiation strategies and planning. Each was tough
and stressful. The nonproliferation endeavor, however, had worked very effectively thus
far. Currently, less than ten countries possess nuclear warheads. The new challenge for
America was in the non-state actors and terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda. The weapons
could possibly somehow end up in the hands of the terrorists and be used against the US
and other developed societies. Another reason to be a major player in the Six-Party Talks
was its longtime commitment to defend South Korea in accordance with the Mutual
Security Agreement of 1953.
d. Results
Compared to the 1993 Geneva Agreed Framework, the scale of the Six-Party
Talks was much bigger. The exact comparison of the outcome therefore cannot be
measured. The Talks certainly had ups and downs. They produced many dissatisfactions
as well as achievements. The greatest disappointment was that the parties never reached
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a final agreement.91 The meetings were concluded in 2007. The nations had promised
for the 7th round, but the DPRK leader Kim Jong-Il became ill. The country was going
through a leadership change. It conducted a series of nuclear experiments and tested
long-distance missiles on a several occasions. And, it performed military attacks on the
ROK and took lives of innocent individuals.
That was the key difference from the previous negotiation, where the US and the
DPRK came up with a settlement at the Framework. Regardless, the Talks offered a
forum for all parties to exchange their positions and proposals. The parties also agreed
that they were committed to resolving the nuclear dispute through peaceful means and
dialogue. The Six-Party Talks were successful largely due to the fact that more than one
nation (America) was involved in trying to convince North Korea to abandon the
weapons and to help the nation by offering economic assistance.92
e. Recommendations
In order to have the DPRK voluntarily dismantle its nuclear weapons system, the
US has to change its diplomatic policy. The 1994 Agreed Framework is considered as a
success case and the Six-Party Talks is viewed as a total failure because there was a
binding settlement in Geneva and none in Beijing. The key distinction between the two
can be found from the American negotiation strategy.

The Clinton administration

worked with North Korea to settle the dispute, whereas the Bush administration simply
ordered the North what to do. Prior to any security guarantee or economic aid, President
Bush told the nation to eliminate the weapons in a “complete, verifiable and irreversible”
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manner.93 The DPRK desired a legally binding non-aggression pact before discussing the
disarmament. Both sides were looking at each other and waiting for the opposition to
drop the weapon first. This situation normally occurs when there is no trust between the
parties. The host country China and the other nations also could not persuade either side
to act before the other. For several years, the parties tried to figure out this issue - who
would go first - when the Geneva case was settled within a year.
There was not much difference between the Framework and the Talks. The
asking elements were the same: security, assistance and disarmament. It was about
applying the right plans and schemes to bring out the desire results. Unless the US is first
to display room for negotiation, the North Korean nuclear dispute will be hard to improve
in the foreseeable future.
There are alternative solutions available to satisfy these needs. Instead of a less
formal written assurance, the US can make a legally binding non-aggression pact which
avoids a possible American attack. Other nations are also ready to supply financial
assistance packages that can have a huge impact on the DPRK economy. No country
gains from the development of nuclear bombs in North Korea. Many states, however,
will benefit from a liberalized DPRK. Some experts worry that the North will secretly
progress the nuclear program while taking these incentives. Under the IAEA surveillance
and its Safeguards regime and the inspection requirement, such a task is almost
impossible to accomplish.
The next Six-Party Talks can bring different results and finish the nuclear dispute.
The US must first restructure its mindset and embrace the methods used in the Agreed
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Framework where President Clinton applied a soft power theory.

President Bush

preferred the complete opposite tactic. The current American President, Barack Obama,
is stuck in between, trying both carrot and stick. Only the carrot will get the job done.
When the strong side negotiates with the weak side, the strong must take two steps
backwards first and make the weak take one step forward. The timing is perfect to
present new offers. The DPRK is now struggling under a new leadership. One of its
closest allies, Iran, has decided to switch its defense policy. It is time for the US
President to send another letter to the leader of North Korea and rewrite history.
5. Human Rights Violations - Prison Camps
A. The Issue
The DPRK is currently violating a number of human rights laws. To identify a
few: labor rights, freedom of expression, freedom of religion, freedom of movement,
freedom of press, minority rights, right to food, forced prostitution, forced abortion, and
right to a fair trial.94 North Korean prison camps and violations against the prisoners are
one of the major ones. The issue has become a popular discussion topic around the globe.
As the North does not provide any information on its prison system, the available facts
are very limited. Numerous former detainees, however, have successfully escaped the
country and testified about their time in the camps. Scholars, the media, international
institutions, and non-governmental organizations (NGO) have discovered adequate
information from the testimonies and produced reports about the camps.
B. Kwan-Li-So
a. Prisoners
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The kwan-li-so labor camps are to imprison social, political, economic or
ideological deviants who are considered a risk to the DPRK. To be more specific,
persons suspected of wrong-doing, wrong-thinking, wrong-knowledge, wrongassociation, or wrong-class-background are captive in the camps.
Wrong-doing may include skipping too many mandatory ideological education
classes, failing to take good care of photographic images of the leaders - Kim Il Sung and
Kim Jong Il, making complaints about living conditions, criticizing regime policies,
travelling without permission, or interacting with South Koreans while travelling outside
the nation. Wrong-thinking can be supporting ideas that go against the official ideology,
which includes any religious beliefs that counter the main philosophy.

Wrong-

knowledge can be applied to North Korean students or diplomats who lived in foreign
nations and returned to the country after their duties. The North believes they may pose a
danger to its population since they had been exposed to capital prosperity, democracy and
civil liberties. Wrong-association is being part of a family whose family members had
been involved in Japan's occupation of Korea or supported the Republic of Korea during
the Korean War. And, lastly, wrong-class includes those who kept close relations with
the Japanese government during Japan's colonial days. It is known that South Korean
and other foreign war prisoners from the Korean War and the Vietnam War are also
incarcerated in these camps.
b. System
There are six kwan-li-so prison camps and they are all large facilities. They are
located in the mountains and mostly in the northern part of the DPRK. The total number
of prisoners is estimated to be between 150,000 and 200,000, and there are about 5,000 to
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50,000 prisoners per camp. 95 The outer perimeters of the prisons are surrounded by
barbed-wire fences, heavily guarded by armed guards. Some detainees are incarcerated
in a single cell and some are in larger units as a group or with family members.
At most times, the offending political prisoner is not the only one who is confined.
His or her parents, children and sometimes grandchildren are imprisoned as well. The
past leader, Kim Il Sung strongly believed in this three generation penalty practice. Such
guilt-by-association was a common procedure in Korean history, which was discontinued
after the Joseon Dynasty (1392-1897) but revived again during the Kim Il Sung era.
Often times, people put in the camps are arrested and charged for no particular
criminal offense. They are definitely not tried in any sort of judicial process. They do
not have the opportunity to appear before a judge, confront the accusers, offer a defense,
or hire a legal counsel. The presumed offenders are one day taken to an interrogation
complex and tortured to confess. They disappear all of a sudden and without notifying
their families, friends, and coworkers. Such an act, forced disappearance with arbitrary
detention and execution, is a clear violation of the international human rights and a
modern day phenomena of repression. Notably, The Standard Minimum Rules for the
Treatment of Prisoners was elected by the Economic and Social Council of the United
Nations General Assembly to set out a good principle of the treatment of prisoners and
the management of institutions. The DPRK prison system completely disobeys these
global norms and standards.
c. Main Problems

95

Yeo Sang Yoon, Ja Eun Lee and Sun Young Han. The North Korean Prison Camps Operation System
and Human Rights Violations. Seoul, Korea: North Korean Human Rights Information Center (2011).

61

The most severe troubles of the DPRK prison camps are below-substance food
rations and hard labor. Due to the food shortage, the prisoners often choose to eat plants,
grass, bark, rats, or snakes. Starvation is not only jeopardizing the lives of inmates but is
also a national crisis and the majority of its citizens are suffering from hunger.
The kwan-li-so camps require hard labor. The detainees are used in producing
mining coal, iron, gold, and other ores. Farming and manufacturing duties are also very
common. The prisoners work twelve hours a day and seven days per week. They have
one rest day per month and celebrate three holidays per year. They are assigned with
daily production quotas and punished if they fail to fulfill their parts. They receive a very
small amount of money for their labor and a small meal per day. They are also given
extremely thin clothes to go through the entire cold winter season. Shoes but no socks
are provided.

Common physical symptoms and illnesses among the inmates are

insufficient protein and calcium in the diet, hunched backs, frostbite, and missing toes,
fingers, hands, arms, or legs from work accidents.96 There are no doctors or adequate
medicine to treat the injuries.
For these reasons, death rates are extremely high in kwan-li-so. Most of the
detainees die in prison with sickness or disease and some of them commit suicide. These
inhumane conditions are often compared to the Soviet Union concentration camps and
even the Holocaust.
d. Execution and Punishments
Those who violate the camp regulations are put into special detention cells. They
are beaten and tortured and die soon after being released. They are punished for various
causes: stealing, unauthorized eating, and failure to meet production quotas, damaging
96
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camp facilities, complaining, or sexual conduct between prisoners. Escape attempts are
punished by execution. The executions are performed while other inmates are watching
from a close range. Some of the detainees witnessing the executions cry out in distress
and some are forced to throw stones at or strike the corpse.
As sexual relations are prohibited, young female inmates who become pregnant
are harshly punished. They are taken away by the guards and often not seen again.
Sexual exploitation of young women is although very common.

These women, in

exchange for sexual favors, receive additional food and less intense work such as record
keeping or cleaning guard offices. The current international human rights law clearly
indicates that sex between prisoners and prison guards constitute rape.
e. Release
Official reported releases occur twice a year from only select camps. Those
extraordinary days are on the birthdays of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. A minor
ceremony is conducted to pledge the appreciation and loyalty to the regime. The released
individuals are sworn to secrecy, promising not to disclose insights of the camps.
Although, a study found that the most North Koreans are well aware of the existence of
the prison camps and refer to the prisoners as "those living in the mountains."97
C. Kyo-Hwa-So
a. Prisoners
Kyo-hwa-so may be translated from Korean as "a place to make a good person
through education." The term is also utilized in the ROK, and it can also be translated as
a "reeducation, enlightenment, re-socialization or edification center." The DPRK has
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kyo-hwa-so in every province. The prisons hold political detainees and people convicted
of criminal offenses. They are known to be brutal labor prison camps.
b. System
The kyo-hwa-so camps, consists of several buildings that are surrounded by high
walls, electrified-wire fencing, and guard towers. Each cell is extremely small and
overcrowded. The education component of the imprisonment is repeatedly memorizing
Kim Il Sung public speeches and editorials which emphasize the regimes' priorities, as
well as organized self-criticism sessions. During these sessions, inmates often confess
crimes that they did not commit and ask for forgiveness.
Kyo-haw-so, similar to kwan-li-so, mandates hard labor while providing belowsubsistence-level food provisions. These circumstances consistently cause weight-loss,
industrial accidents, malnutrition-related diseases, and death. Again, medical doctors and
medications are rarely available. Many detainees, therefore, die in prison and before the
completion of their sentences.
c. Kwan-li-so v. Kyo-hwa-so
There are some differences between the two discussed prison camps. Kwan-li-so
confine only the political wrongdoers. Whereas, Kyo-hwa-so contain people with both
criminal and political convictions. At kyo-hwa-so, there is no custody policy of the
convict's family members.

The kyo-hwa-so detainees are found guilty after going

through the judicial process and given a fixed term sentence. Their imprisonment is also
not in secrecy as their families and friends know exactly which camp center they are
incarcerated at and why. In a nutshell, kyo-hwa-so are correctional facilities for persons
with serious criminal backgrounds or who committed felony level crimes.
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Another unique group that is captivated at kyo-hwa-so is those who have been
repatriated from China. They end up at the prisons often without trial and beaten and
tortured by the prison guards. Repatriation is considered as a heavy crime and treated
critically in the DPRK.
D. Human Rights Violations
a. International Standards and Norms
The DPRK prison camps violate various international human rights standards: the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Rome Statute of the international Criminal
Court, and the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.98
In particular, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court should be examined
since the camps significantly challenge the definition of "crimes against humanity." The
term "crimes against humanity" covers the topics of murder; extermination; enslavement;
deportation or forcible population transfer; imprisonment or severe deprivations of
physical liberty, torture, rape or sexual slavery; persecution on political, racial, national,
ethnic, cultural, gender or religious grounds; enforced disappearances; apartheid. The
Rome Statute has been signed by 139 UN Member States and ratified by 117 members.
ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
ARTICLE 7
1. For the purpose of this Statute, “crime against humanity” means any of the following acts when
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with
knowledge of the attack:
a. Murder;
b. Extermination;
c. Enslavement;
d. Deportation or forcible transfer of population;
e. Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of
fundamental rules of international law;
98
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f. Torture;
g. Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or
any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity;
h. Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national,
ethnic, cultural, religious, gender, … or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible
under international law in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the
jurisdiction of the Court;
i. Enforced disappearance of person;
j. The crime of apartheid;
k. Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering or serious
injury to body or to mental or physical health.
Adopted by the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, Rome, Italy. Entered into force June 2002.

b. "Gross Violations"
There are a number of other violations involved in North Korean prison camps.
The sudden disappearances and no available information regarding their whereabouts
take away the physical liberty. The deportations and subsequent imprisonments happen
without any judicial procedures. Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) verifies that suspected offenders have the right to judicial
proceedings conducted in accordance with due process and fair trial. Article 9 identifies
that no one should be subject to arbitrary arrest. The incarceration of the family members
of the detainees is a violation of Article 26 - right to equal protection and nondiscrimination, including on grounds of political or other opinion, birth, or other status.
The insufficient food supply and hard labor disobeys Article 10, which necessitates
people deprived from liberty to be treated with humanity and with respect for inherent
dignity. More specifically, Article 8 directly forbids forced or compulsory labor. Under
Article 11, sovereign states also need to offer adequate food to prisoners, as well as
present the right to freedom from hunger.
The executions in the prisons go against Article 6 of the ICCPR, which entails the
inherent right to life. The article further instructs that the death penalty must be carried
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out with a final judgment rendered by a competent court. Beatings and torture performed
by the prison guards are banned by Article 7. The additional harassments that follow the
executions contravene the terminology in Article 7 - other inhumane act. The detainees
who watch the executions and are forced to abuse the corpse suffer from great injury to
mental health.
The International Criminal Court Statute highlights the crime against humanity of
extermination, and the high numbers of deaths in detention are a clear violation. The
forced abortion and the three generation guilty-by-association practices are as well a part
of the crime against humanity of extermination clause. The punishments for repatriation
are also considered as a crime against humanity of extermination.
Fundamental Rules of International Law
Articles of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights violated in North Korea’s political
penal labor colonies:
Article 6 (right to life);
Article 7 (right not be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment);
Article 8 (right not to be held in slavery or servitude);
Article 9 (right not be held in arbitrary detention):
Article 10 (right for all persons deprived of liberty to be treated with humanity);
Article 12 (right to free movement);
Article 16 (right to recognition as a person before the law);
Article 17 (right not to be subjected to arbitrary interference with privacy, family,
home or correspondence);
Article 18 (right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion);
Article 19 (right to hold opinion without interference);
Article 21 (right to peaceable assembly);
Article 22 (right to freedom of association);
Article 26 (rights to equal protection and non-discrimination, including on
grounds of political or other opinion, birth, or other status.)

E. Recommendations
a. UN Members States
At the United Nations Human Rights Council and General Assembly, the member
states can vote for the resolutions on the DPRK human rights impasse. This should
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include establishing a commission of inquiry and a panel of experts whose task is to
oversee the situation and write UN reports to publicize and stress the seriousness of the
crisis. This effort would make it more difficult for North Korea to deny the existence of
the prison camps and pressure the nation to make proper changes. The commission and
the panel should principally question the applicability of the responsibility to protect
doctrine. The UN sees its responsibility to protect citizens when their own governments
fail to do so and they are subjected to the crimes against humanity. The member states
that maintain diplomatic relations with the North can also play a major role. They may
propose that they are willing to discontinue the relationship unless the DPRK improves
the human rights violations.
b. China
China is in a unique position whenever the international community attempts to
discuss the DPRK issues. It is a father figure to North Korea and always tries to protect
the country from outside pressure, especially at the UN Security Council gatherings. The
reason behind this is due to their close relations in history and their current close trade
ties. In terms of the human rights violations in the North, China should cease the
repatriation of North Koreans back to the DPRK. This especially includes aged people,
women and children. When these persons are forced to return to the North, they are
mostly executed or beaten and tortured in the prison camps for the rest of their lives.
China must also allow the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to
interview the North Koreans hiding in the nation. The UNHCR should have the authority
to examine those who would face immediate danger upon their return to the DPRK and
find appropriate solutions. Noting that China already agreed to and signed the Refugee
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Convention, it has to give out citizenships to North Korean refugees and permit these
individual to settle and make adequate living in China.
c. ROK, US and Japan
When the Six-Party Talks resume, the human rights problems must be discussed
followed by the security and economic matters. Usually, the parties gather with the
common goal of resisting the DPRK nuclear weapon development program by offering
both financial and economic incentives. The human rights violations are another agenda
that must be included and the parties should attempt to find ways to resolve the issue at
these meetings. The ROK, the US and Japan can also continue to provide asylum,
residence and citizenship to North Koreans who successfully escape the country. This
should include some assistance in adjusting to a new culture and living environment as
most of these people struggle to find jobs in new countries and survive in new life
settings.
6. Human Rights Violations - Defectors
A. The Issue
The issue on the DPRK defectors is becoming a critical concern for many nations,
international agencies, and human rights groups. The key reason is that the number of
defectors is on the rise. There are over 100,000 defectors residing in China.99 Almost
3,000 defectors have been entering the ROK annually during recent years.100 This is a
100% increase from the early 2000s. 101 Many also wish to go to other developed
countries such as the US and Western Europe.
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Choosing to leave one’s country is a difficult decision to make. To escape a
nation like North Korea is another challenging process. Settling down and making
lifestyle adjustments in other countries are also demanding and stressful for the defectors.
Most states welcome the North Korean defectors. They offer various programs and
financial support to help them. China, however, returns the defectors to the North. It
does not classify them as refugees or asylum seekers and does not provide citizenship
opportunity.
B. Reasons
a. Economical
Most North Korean defectors leave their nation for economic reasons. They flee
to search for employment and make a living outside the country. These economic
defectors have no intention to return home in the foreseeable future, not until the nation's
economic situation makes progress.
The number of economic defectors has been consistently high during the two
decades. Since its first leader Kim Il Sung's death in 1994, the DPRK economy has been
in recession. The economic system has deteriorated since this time. Both production and
consumption have fallen. Various economic stimulus plans have constantly failed. Its
economic growth rate was below par during most of the 1990s. The rate was barely
above zero during the 2000s. The public food distribution was disrupted on many
occasions. North Korea also suffered a severe famine in the 1990s. Over 1 million
individuals lost their lives due to starvation and 200,000 to 300,000 of its citizens escaped
the nation during this time. 102 Today, many people in the North engage in informal
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trading and private cultivation. Numerous free markets or the so-called farmers markets
and even black markets also operate in the country, which violate its national laws. If the
DPRK continues to focus on its military and spend most of its budget on defense, a
sudden economic recovery is almost impossible. It can be therefore easily predicted that
the number of economic defectors from the North will remain high over the next several
years.
b. Political
Defectors also flee for political reasons. North Koreans who have visited other
nations, people who witnessed the outside world through the Internet, and those who
heard about the developed world from foreigners attempt to leave their country simply
for a better life.

The North still functions under the communist doctrine.

The

government has complete control over its citizens. Both politically and economically,
individuals do not enjoy much freedom and the fundamental legal rights which are often
widely available in most countries.
This is one of the main reasons the DPRK is cautious to open its borders for both
leisure and business. Travelling requires significant interactions. When the citizens of a
nation network with foreigners, they are exposed to new ideas, values and beliefs. They
make improvements from these new views and regularly seek for betterment. When this
desire becomes larger, people reach out to the outside world at a greater scale. The
Internet also brings the international community a lot closer. People can find fault with
its system and government through new technologies. North Koreans accordingly would
want to take the risk to be a part of a liberalized society and have a brighter future. The
entire structure will then begin to disintegrate.
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c. Cross-Borders
There are also simple cross-borders who leave home on a temporary basis for
work or a family visit. A number of North Koreans engage in border commerce with the
Chinese. They usually trade Korean food and forest products with processed food and
consumer goods manufactured in China. North Koreans also have family members and
relatives living in China. They are allowed to make trips to China with special travel
permits. These individuals are different from other defectors that they are not leaving
home permanently and have the intention of returning when their needs are fulfilled.
C. Routes
a. South
There are two ways to escape the North.

The first method is taking the

southbound route. This approach is, however, extremely difficult and has taken away
numerous lives. In fact, only 1 out of 40 successfully makes it this way.103 The ROKDPRK border, which runs 155 miles from the West Sea to the East Sea, is known to be a
heavily armed demilitarized zone. 104 Anyone who attempts to cross the border is
challenged with military patrol guards, land mines, and electric wires.

Unless the

defector has military background and is physically well trained, this path would not be
preferred. This is, however, the shortest route to reach the most desired destination South Korea. Some defectors therefore are willing to take a higher risk to acquire a
greater result.
b. North
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The other way is through the China-DPRK border. North Korea shares most of
its northern inland border with China, about 90 percent.105 The Tumen River is a famous
cross place for the defectors since there are some spots where the depth of the river is
shallow so that people can cross more easily, especially in winter when the water is
frozen. But, this northern route also presents many difficulties. It takes several days to
reach the borderline to begin with. Security points are located every 50 meters, watching
defectors fleeing to China and foreign spies attempting to enter the nation illegally.
North Korean defectors who get caught by patrol guards can run away, fight, or bribe
them. Due to the recent economic downturn in the North, the bribery option works best
against the border guards. The country is where “nothing can be done without money
and anything can be done with money.”106 The middle and upper class defectors often
utilize brokers who arrange the entire trip from the DPRK to the final destination. The
broker’s fee exceeds $8,000 (USD).107
D. Destinations
a. China
China may be the easiest nation in which to flee, but the defectors face countless
tests upon arrival. Since they are not familiar with anybody and have no place to go, they
seek help from the Korean-Chinese and local Korean churches. There are currently 2
million Korean-Chinese residing in the cities near the China-DPRK border. These local
Koreans often offer assistance to the defectors although it is against Chinese law to help
illegal immigrants. It becomes harder, however, if the size of the defector group is too
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large. Those that bring their entire family must split up and execute separate settlement
plans.
Most defectors immediately look for employment in China. Due to their illegal
status, they have to choose low income jobs that normally require hard labor. Most of
them end up working in farms since agriculture is still the dominant profession in China,
especially in the suburban areas. Many of the female defectors are, in fact, very popular
among Chinese farmers and are being “sold” to them as bribes since there is a gender
imbalance in the rural areas of China. The current trend for young Chinese women is to
move to large cities for better employment opportunities. Even when North Korean
women are married to Chinese men, Chinese law specifies that they are not eligible for
Chinese citizenship. This law even applies to the children who are born from these
marriages. The children do not enjoy the chance to apply for neither legal residency nor
citizenship.
Other women are extremely vulnerable to trafficking. As they are scared of being
forcibly repatriated, they have no option other than working for the traffickers. Some of
them are used as hostesses in bars or as prostitutes. Many female defectors also end up
being exploited. They work for long hours with very little payment or sometimes no
payment at all.

They know too well that their employers can report to the local

government about their illegal immigration status. It takes several months to relocate
themselves to other countries. So, the defectors have to learn to survive and make a
living in these difficult conditions during this time period.
China has been very unclear and ambiguous with the North Korean defector issue.
It has never publicly declared official policy guidelines on the subject matter. It has been
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very reluctant to grant the status of refugees to the defectors as the nation does not see
them as political refugees but rather economic floaters who are not qualified for legal
protection. One reason China is taking this position is largely due to a request by the
DPRK. The North frequently demands China to return the defectors. The two nations
also signed An Agreement on Repatriation of Border Crossers in 1987. Sometimes China
intensifies arrests of defectors whenever high ranking North Korean leaders visit the
nation and hand over the defectors to the leaders upon their departure. Still today, China
requests Korean Chinese and Korean religious and civic organizations not to offer
assistance to defectors and report them to the local agencies. The fine for breaking this
regulation is over $3,000 (USD).108
b. Other Nations
The neighboring states in Asia and other developed countries tend to offer
generous resettlement packages to North Korean defectors. The popular final destination
is the ROK for obvious reasons. They try to find overseas South Korean embassies and
general consulates (ROK government offices in China cannot support defectors due to the
domestic law) or take the boats used for smuggling. There are numerous vessels on the
Yellow Sea that transport goods and workers between China and the South. These ships
also make earnings by smuggling illegal products and immigrants. On average, it takes
approximately a year to successfully enter the ROK. The reward of this long journey is
worthwhile as South Korea is known for offering adequate financial aid and appropriate
refugee programs. North Korean defectors have less difficulties living in the South than
any other states.
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Sweden, Switzerland, and other Western European nations are also very popular
locations for the defectors. The countries have very strong government structure and
have high respect for human rights. England, in particular, pays a monthly allowance of
$660 (USD) to the defectors once they are given asylum in the United Kingdom.109 The
US has accepted a number of North Korean defectors in recent years. It fully understands
the current political and economic situations in the DPRK and generally grants asylum
and assistance to North Korean immigrants.
E. Human Rights Violations
a. International Standards and Norms
Listed below are the current international human rights laws.

The DPRK

presently shows no intention to respect the regulations, and China is also severely
violating the laws. It is although crucial to point out that no international law approves
“right to enter” an adjacent state as nations have the full authority to control their
immigration status.
Anyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his
country.
Article 13.2 Universal Declaration of Human Rights
Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.
Article 12.2 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
“No State Party shall expel, return (“refouler”) or extradite a person to another State
where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being
subjected to torture. For the purposes of determining whether there are such grounds, the
competent authorities shall take into account all relevant considerations including where
applicable, the existence in the State concerned of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant
or mass violations of human rights.”
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Article 3, Convention Against Torture, Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (ratified by China 4 October 1988)
[T]he term “refugee” shall apply to any person who:…owing to well-founded fear of
being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or,
owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who,
not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as
a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
Article 1, Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951
… A person who was not a refugee when he left his country, but who becomes a refugee
at a later date, is called a refugee “sur place.”
… A person may become a refugee “sur place” as a result of his own actions, such as
….expressing his political views in his country of residence. Whether such actions are
sufficient to justify a well-founded fear of persecution must be determined by a careful
examination of the circumstances. Regard should be had in particular to whether such
actions may have come to the notice of the authorities of the person’s country of origin
and how they are likely to be viewed by those authorities.
Paragraphs 94 and 96 of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees Handbook:
Procedures and Standards for Registration, 2003
No contracting state shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner
whatsoever to the frontier of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on
account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion.
Article 33, Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951
b. Gross Violations
The DPRK prohibits its citizens from leaving the nation. This is a direct violation
of Article 13.2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 12.2 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Both legal regulations indicate that
everybody has the right to leave any country, including their own.

According to the

1951 Refugee Convention, North Korean defectors fleeing to China are identified as
“refugees” and “asylum seekers.” They have fear of being persecuted if they remain in
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the North and are unwilling to return to the nation. Paragraphs 94 and 96 of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Handout mentions that the definition of
“refugees sur place” or “refugees in place” applies to persons who may not have fled a
nation for fear of persecution, but who will face persecution when returned to the
country.110 Most North Korean defectors in China are in this situation because of the fact
that they are categorized as traitors for leaving the nation without the permission from
their government. Furthermore, the Refugee Convention and the Convention Against
Torture, Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment prevent states from
expelling or returning defectors who face danger upon return to their home country.
China is violating these terms. Especially since it ratified the Convention against Torture
in October 1988 and is still sending back the North Korean defectors.
F. Recommendations
a. China
China must discontinue returning North Korean defectors who are likely to suffer
persecution upon their return to the nation. It should permit the UN High Commissioner
for Refugees to enter China and carefully evaluate the situation of the North Korean
defectors. It should also comply with the Refugee Convention which it signed and
ratified back in 1988.
China must obey the guidelines of the UN Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women and the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child. It has
to investigate the condition of female North Korean defectors in China and make certain
that they do not become victims of trafficking and marriage enslavement due to their

110

Yeo Sang Yoon, Ja Eun Lee and Sun Young Han. The North Korean Prison Camps Operation System
and Human Rights Violations,p. 83.

78

illegal immigration status. It has to avoid returning children to the DPRK if there is
reasonable ground to believe that they face imminent danger from their government.
China should also allow North Korean women who have married Chinese men to apply
for citizenship of China and their children to have access to school and health care.
b. UN Member States
Europe, the US, the Northeast Asian nations, and the rest of the UN member
states will continue to offer asylum, residence and citizenship to North Korean defectors.
They will also present the defectors with refugee and resettlement programs and financial
aid to help them adjust to a new lifestyle. But, more importantly, the countries have to
remind China that it is violating international human rights standards and norms. They
must keep pressuring the nation to analyze the issue with a different viewpoint and
immediately implement proper amendments. Since China has gained undeniable power
over the last few decades, such a task will be hard to accomplish. This is especially true
since the North Korean defector matter is yet to become one of the most debated topics
within the global community. More states are, however, acknowledging the problem
recently as the number of defectors has grown over the past decade and the issue has
started to cause direct impact to the countries. It is also always ideal to manage trouble
before it gets too problematic.
The number of the DPRK defectors will thus continue to increase. More and
more North Koreans are discovering the outside world through modern technologies, and
they are building stronger desires to one day live in a developed society. Unless the
nation decides to strengthen the border security, a greater number of people will try to
cross a frozen Tumen River and move into China.
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Human rights workers should not concentrate on fixing the primary cause of the
problem – poor economic and political conditions in the North. Rather they should focus
on the troubles the DPRK defectors face once they leave the country. In other words,
they should attempt to change China and its policy towards North Korean defectors. In
some cases, where the media was closely following the Chinese government, the nation
sent the defectors to third countries and their desired destinations. It can be therefore
concluded that the pressure from the international community matters to China and can
alter its perspective on the North.
This is where the problem lies. It is not about the DPRK’s struggling economy.
It is not about its government structure. It is rather about China’s foreign relations with
North Korea. If nation states, international institutions, and human rights organizations
manage this area of problem, it will have a huge influence on the issue and help create a
strong stepping-stone towards resolving the entire matter.
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Chapter V: Arab Spring & North Korea
1. Arab Spring - Most Impacted Nations
A. Background
Similar to the term the Autumn of Nations, which describes the fall of the Berlin
Wall and the other democracy movements around the globe in 1989, the Arab Spring (or
sometimes called the Arab Awakening) is a term that illustrates a series of riots and
protests that occurred in the Arab world since December 2010. The primary cause for the
Arab Spring was dissatisfaction with government. The citizens of the Arab states were
displeased with dictatorship, monarchy, corruption, a weak economy, unemployment, and
human rights violations. People were also largely concerned about inflation and food
security, which were a result of the 2007-2008 global famine and food price crisis. They
were attempting to accomplish regime change, democracy and free elections.

They

planned to achieve these goals by revolutions, uprisings, civil wars, and demonstrations.
The youth population played a great role in the Arab Spring.
educated and Internet savvy.

They were literate,

In fact, they communicated, raised awareness, and

organized the insurgencies mostly through the Internet and some of the more popular
social media websites. The younger generation was inspired by the lifestyle in the
modernized, liberalized, and developed nations and desired to form a higher standard of
living and more promising future for their own countries.
B. Tunisia
The series of revolts generally took place in the Middle East and North Africa.
The most affected nations were Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Syria, and Bahrain. It
would not be an overstatement if one argues that the Arab Spring was initiated by a
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Tunisian named Mohamed Bouazizi. He was unemployed and made a living by selling
fruits as a street vendor.

On December 17, 2010, municipal officers harassed and

humiliated Bouazizi in public and confiscated his wares. While street vending was legal
in Tunisia, bribery was a normal activity and Bouazizi did not bribe the officials. An
hour after the incident, he expressed his anger and frustration by covering himself with
gasoline and setting himself on fire. His self-immolation brought together diverse groups
dissatisfied with government to begin the Tunisian revolution. There had been numerous
rebellions throughout Tunisian history, but none of them were quite serious. Following
Bouazizi's death there were many violent riots, which resulted in a number of deaths and
serious injuries.

Despite strong resistance from police and security forces, the

demonstrators successfully overthrew the government, as well as the long-time Tunisian
President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali.

He occupied the presidency for 23 years and

managed to flee to Saudi Arabia and avoid execution by his citizens. New political and
legal systems were implemented soon after Ben Ali's departure and the effect spread out
to the neighboring Arab states and other African countries.
C. Egypt
Protests started in Egypt on January 25, 2011. At first, its government was able to
eliminate the nation's Internet access as the rebels were organizing their rallies through
social network services. But, it lost control as the President Hosni Mubarak and his
cabinet were replaced by new political members. His successor, Mohammed Morsi, was
the first democratically elected president in Egypt and sworn in before the supreme court
justices. President Mubarak was later sentenced to life in prison for failing to limit
casualties during the earlier period of the revolution. There were a large number of
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deaths during the Egyptian revolution as the Armed Forces of Egypt were largely
involved. The military, however, also worked together with the rebels to change the
then-current government.
D. Libya
Libya can be considered a special case as the UN, the US, and many other nations
were engaged in the situation. Additionally, the long-time dictator, Colonel Muammar
Gaddafi, was captured and killed by rebels. Anti-government riots began in Libya in
February 2011. The government soon dispatched elite troops and militia to oppose the
activities. But, as the death toll continued to rise, the UN Security Council adopted
Resolution 1973 and authorized a no-fly zone over Libya and all necessary measures to
protect civilians. Soon after the US, France, England, and other European countries
through NATO began using force by air in Libya to bomb Gaddafi forces. No NATO
troops were deployed on the ground. The confrontations in Libya were viewed as a civil
war instead of protests in a sense that the scale was much greater and the government
refused to back down or compromise, as they had in Tunisia and Egypt.
E. Yemen
The Yemeni revolution erupted to press the resignation of President Ali Abdullah
Saleh. A series of protest marches were carried out in major cities, and the demonstrators
and frequent military encounters turned into urban warfare. President Saleh was given an
opportunity to agree to the Gulf Cooperation Council initiative, which requested his
resignation in exchange for immunity. As he was hesitant to sign the agreement, a
number of assassination attempts were conducted including a bomb blast in the
presidential compound. President Saleh and much of the government staff suffered
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physically injuries from the attack. A few months later, he decided to step down and
transfer the authority to the Vice President Abd al-Rah Mansur al-Hadi, who later was
voted to take over the presidency.
F. Syria
Syria also experienced a civil war and the uprising began in a manner similar to
the one in Tunisia. A police officer assaulted a man in public in old Damascus. Plus, the
security forces arrested 15 children in a southern Syria city, Daraa, for writing slogans
against the government. Soon after, protestors gathered together in a large group to call
for the release of the children and initiated riots against the Baathist regime, which had
been ruling Syria since 1963. They formed the Free Syrian Army to fight against the
Syrian military. The Syrian forces, however, were too strong for the rebels and were not
hesitant to hurt civilians and often committed massacres, killing thousands of innocent
people. At this date, the conflict is still on-going in Syria and over 100,000 people have
died with over six million individuals forced to leave their homes.
G. Bahrain
The demonstrations in Bahrain began in a more peaceful way. The initial aim
was to obtain greater political freedom and respect for human rights. They were not
intending to overthrow the monarchy. The protests, however, became more violent as
police and army forces tried to resist the rallies and in the process harmed a number of
individuals. After the killings, King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa ordered his troops to
withdraw.

But, as the marches became more intense, he had to declare a state of

emergency and send back the forces. There were reports that the police committed
torture and other human rights violations such as denial of medical care to prisoners who
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were captured during the parades. The Bahrain government does not strictly deny these
facts, but has refused entry to international human rights groups, UN inspectors, and
news organizations.
H. The Rest
The Arab Spring has affected not only the surrounding areas but also the rest of
the globe.

Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Albania, Croatia, Burkina Faso, Uganda,

Nigeria, and even an Asian nation, the Maldives, were all influenced by the events.
Protest movements in the Maldives led to the resignation of its President. While the
international community has been supporting the uprisings, some critics have accused the
US and other developed countries for not getting involved. Other than the Libyan case,
they have not been engaged and have decided to observe the happenings without taking
sides, except for humanitarian aid to rebels in Syria. As stated above, the youth and their
Internet and digital technology usage have been a crucial part of the Arab Spring. In fact,
the number of social media network users doubled during the protests. The younger
generation has created a new concept of a 'digital democracy' and proven how shared
ideas and dynamics of the crowd in a participatory system have an enormous power to
form collective action.
2. Synthesis & Analysis - North Korea
A. Effect on the DPRK
The Arab Spring had a limited effect in the DPRK. There were several other
factors that could explain why similar riots did not occur in North Korea. First, unlike
the Arab states, there had been very little economic development in the North. People
who visited Pyongyang would recognize some changes, but there has hardly been any
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modernizing effort and the overall economic growth has continued to be very low. The
per capita gross national income in 2009, $960, was lower compared to 1990, at
$1,146.111 The life expectancy rate was also down from 70.2 to 67.4.112 About one-third
of the population live in extreme poverty. The key element of the Arab Spring, rising
expectations and hope for a better lifestyle, was absent from the society. Its citizens were
too concerned with daily survival and the next meal.
North Korea has a relatively young and literate population. The median age is
32.9 years.113 Literacy rate is 100 percent.114 This population is, however, different from
the Arab states and is unlikely to fight against the government. In a communist country,
there are no unemployed personnel as everyone labors for the state. These people could
be paid a very small salary, but were not dissatisfied with their employment status as the
young individuals in the Middle East. Moreover, North Korean young males spend up to
12 years in the military.115 This is perhaps the longest service terms in the entire globe.
And the purpose is to maintain a strong force and keep young men out of trouble. There
is also no leisure time available for the youth to gather and share ideas. The government
always forces them to participate in extra activities and ideological indoctrination.
The contagion effect did not work well in the North either. As soon as the
revolutions began to intensify in the Middle East, the DPRK prohibited its citizens from
using the Internet, watching television, using radio, and visiting foreign countries, which
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included restricted travelling of its diplomats.116 It did not want its people to witness the
Arab Spring and formulate similar actions against the government.

Some non-

governmental organizations sent leaflets and newspaper reports into North Korea
describing the rebellions in the Arab states. They utilized various methods to do this, but
these attempts affected only a very small percentage of the whole population. The
literacy rate was sufficiently high, but Internet access and a free press were not available
in the North for people to be influenced by the Arab Awakening.
Cellular phone usage was also a comparable element. The cellular phone was
first introduced in the DPRK in 2002. At first, only the elites in Pyongyang were
permitted to use the phones. But, in 2004, the government banned the usage of mobile
phones as it discovered that an assassination attempt on Kim Jong Il was made, utilizing a
cell phone-detonated bomb. More recently, in 2008, an Egyptian corporation, Orascom,
acquired the sole contract to sell mobile phones in North Korea. A year later, the
company sold 70,000 units. At the time of the Arab Spring revolutions in 2011 and 2012,
the number rose to 500,000. This increase, however, only represented approximately 1.8
percent of the population.
Another piece that was present in the Arab Spring but missing in the North was
the exiled elites.

This group embodied individuals who left their county to gain

education and employment and return to their homeland with plans and a desire to rebuild
and reform the nation. An Egyptian, Mohamed ElBaradei, is a perfect example of this
case. ElBaradei was educated and worked in Western countries, including his tenure as
the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency. He later returned to
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Egypt and was a symbol of reform for the rebel groups during the revolutionary
movements.

He was fully involved in politics and later became the Egyptian vice

president. The DPRK, however, lacks this kind of leader figure. Most of the defectors
fleeing North Korea blamed the economic situation, and quite surprisingly not the dear
leaders or overall political situation. As was seen during the Arab Spring, leaders or selfimmolation sparked the revolutions. But, these factors were nonexistent in North Korea.
B. The Korean Spring
The Korean Spring, however, is still a possibility. It is not just because the DPRK
government could not completely stop the stories from spreading mostly in a large city
like Pyongyang. The elites and university students had access to the Internet and the
news on the Arab Spring could be told to one another through word-of-mouth. There is
also a series of events that occurred in North Korea in recent years.
In 2002, after North Korea survived a severe famine, it went through a brief
economic reform. The public distribution system had failed and the government had no
choice but to lift price controls and introduce market mechanisms. The regime simply
did not have any food to give out and told its people to fend for themselves. It received
foreign aid and loans and the economy was able to recover after a while. It resumed the
ration system, but was incapable of completely ending market activity. Today, the
citizens of the North rely heavily on markets. The farmers, factory workers, and urban
residents all do business on the black market and collect substantial profit. During
interviews, the DPRK defectors admitted that more than half of their income was
generated from private practices. The individuals residing in Pyongyang purchase their
food from the market. Experts predict that it is almost impossible to make this activity
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disappear in North Korea.117 Even if it has already been 12 years since the country tried
to modify its economic structure, people cannot forget what they saw and experienced.
Additionally, the market system allows individuals to start their own businesses and this
entrepreneurship creates independence from the government.

The currency

redenomination in 2009 is also a memorable occasion for its citizens.

To uproot

marketization, the government implemented the new denomination and people could only
exchange a portion of their savings for the new currency. The citizens reacted to the
situation with anger and despair. Some of them committed suicide, fought with police,
and defiantly protested in the public square. This behavior showed that a portion of the
population no longer fear the regime.118 Through these two incidents, Kim Jong Il left a
mark on society in North Korea that is irreversible and can damage the regime later on.
Until recently, the North had only one Facebook and Twitter account that was set
up by the government.

This is, however, changing very rapidly.

The Pyongyang

University of Science and Technology (PUST) was opened in 2010. The nation needs
the Internet to obtain information without sending its personnel to foreign countries. The
Internet saves them money and limits interaction with foreigners. The Internet also helps
the regime to mobilize foreign direct investment. The government staff therefore can use
the Internet for intelligence purposes and the university students for educational ones.
This is, however, a very risky project for the regime. It is allowing the best and smartest
groups to gain access to the Internet and surf the web. Someone who has negative views
towards the government can spread news about the Arab Spring and the truth about the
outside world and that there are better societies and they too can make changes to live
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quality lives. The Internet is very much like the market system. Once people know there
are tools available that provide them convenience and efficiency, it is extremely hard to
take that away from them.
Cellular phones apply a similar formula. Phones enable better communication
and are necessary devices for the elites in the DPRK. Even though the regime limits cell
phone usage to select people, some people buy phones smuggled in from China on
prepaid SIM cards. These individuals not only communicate with each other via mobile
devices but also have web access. This is something the government cannot control
unless it shuts down its entire wireless infrastructure, which the elites would not agree to
do because of the inconvenience it may bring upon their daily lives. The total number of
mobile phone users has now passed 2 million.119 It took three years to reach 1 million
users, but only one year to double that number. The number is continuing to grow and is
spreading like wild-fire.
The regime witnessed the Arab Spring and is apparently affected by what
happened on the other side of the globe. Its reactions to the events reflected a sense of
vulnerability.120 The revolutions in the Middle East and North Africa proved to them that
authoritarian regimes were inherently unstable. The government relies heavily on its
military. There have been a number of reported domestic disturbances. The military,
however, has always been there to prevent the actions from widening. Although, if the
youth in the military should decide to disobey Kim Jong Un, it would be a totally
different scenario. Its forces would be fighting against each other. Prior to the Arab
Spring, most persons believed that things would not change in the region. But the Arab
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governments collapsed all of a sudden and in a reasonably short period of time. All four
dictators - Zine El Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia, Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, Muammar
Qaddafi of Libya, and Ali Abdullah Saleh - had each been ruling their regimes longer
than Kim Jong Il and definitely Kim Jong Un. The new young leader and his cabinet
know that they are living on borrowed time and changes are soon to be made in the
DPRK.
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Chapter VI: Kaesong Industrial Zone
1. Background
The Kaesong Industrial Zone (KIZ) is in the city of Kaesong, the DPRK. The
KIZ is located 43 miles north of the capital of the ROK, Seoul, and 106 miles southeast
of the capital of the DPRK, Pyongyang.

It is also only 3 miles away from the

demilitarized zone (DMZ). The KIZ is a unique place in a sense that it is one location
where people from the South and the North are allowed to interact on a daily basis. To
be more specific, it is an industrial complex where the two Koreas agreed to build a joint
economic territory with a combination of North's human labor and South's capital
investment and business knowhow. As indicated in Table 2 below, the KIZ is growing
quickly since its opening in 2004. The two nations also plan to make a significant
expansion within a few years. This thesis finds that the KIZ serves as a unique element
that can affect the DPRK reform.

Figure 1-7: Kaesong Industrial Zone (Korea Trade Investment Promotion Agency)
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Table 3: KIZ Growth from 2005 to 2012
Category

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

No. of
enterprises
in operation

18

30

65

93

117

121

123

123

Production
(US$ million)

14.9

73.7

184.8

251.4

256.5

323.3

401.9

469.5

507

791

785

1,055

935

804

776

786

6,013

11,160

22,538

38,931

42,561

46,284

49,866

53,448

40,874

69,999

100,092

152,637

111,830

122,997

114,435

120,119

South
Korean
workers
North
Korean
workers
No. of
visitors

2. Sunshine Policy
The KIZ project was initiated when the ROK President, Kim Dae Jung, visited the
DRPK in 2000. The President and the leader of the North, Kim Jong Il, agreed to form
an economic relationship. North Korea went through a devastating famine in the late
1990s and needed to desperately improve its economic situation. Kim Jong Il came up
with various ways to restore the economy including boosting foreign investment, trade
and aid from the neighboring states such as Japan, China, and Russia. The KIZ was also
another ideal approach, and this was true for a number of reasons.
The ROK agreed to take the entire financial burden and develop the complex
from scratch.

Two large South Korean firms, Hyundai Asan and the Korea Land

Corporation, mostly managed the 800 acres development process. The KIZ contains not
only state-of-the-art manufacturing factories but also all other necessary supporting
facilities including a post office, police and fire stations, a library, a hospital, an
exhibition center, a bank, and lodging. It also has an extensive infrastructure system,
which includes road, railroad, telecommunication, electricity, water supply (purification
and drainage plant), and waste plant. Additionally, the DPRK enjoys the opportunity to
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train its workers and help them obtain diverse business and management skills. Most
ROK companies operating in the KIZ serve in different industries, which allows the
North Korean laborers to attain diverse experiences and knowledge. Lastly, the nation
collects constant income from the salary paid by the South Korean companies to its
citizens working in the KIZ which totals approximately $30 million per year.121 There
are also other business fees. Hyundai Asan, for instance, paid $450 million in 2000 to
purchase a business license.122
Table 4: Types of South Korean Companies in the KIZ
Total

Textiles

Machinery
and
Metals

Electric &
Electronics

Chemicals

Paper
and
Wood

Food

Nonmetal
Minerals

123

72

23

13

9

3

2

1

The ROK companies are attracted to the KIZ despite the risk that is involved in
doing business in a communist country. First, the minimum wage rate is lower than
China and Vietnam. There is a low employee turnover rate and no possibility of labor
dispute. Second, the rent price for land is US$41 per square meter, which is five times
less than other industrial parks. Third, the corporate income tax rate is only 14% of the
net profit.123 The firms get a tax exemption for five years from the first profit-generating
year and the tax rate is cut by 50% for the following three years. 124 Fourth, the South
offers loans with low interest rates and political risk insurance that will reimburse up to
90% of a company's investment in the KIZ. Fifth, the KIZ is close to the ROK's Incheon
International Airport and there are no applied tariffs. Sixth, the KIZ is a duty-free area.
Anyone can use foreign currency and credit cards and there is no visa required for entry
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or exit. Lastly, the complex has its own law and South Koreans faced with legal issues
are not to go on trial in the DPRK. The South Korean government expects the number of
firms moving into the KIZ will rise as the complex will expand to 6,000 acres with
shopping districts, residential areas, and tourist and recreation facilities.
3. Issues
A. Labor
It is often claimed that the KIZ workers are being exploited and the DPRK is
violating the international human rights and labor law. This is because it is unclear what
portion of the wages they acquire from the ROK companies for their labor is kept for
themselves and how much is being given to their government. It is estimated that the
North Korean authorities take as much as 45%.125 Experts, however, assert that the KIZ
average wages and working conditions are much better compared to other individuals in
the North. The monthly minimum wage is $60.78.126 The employees receive a 15%
social insurance fee provided for unemployment and occupational hazards.127 They get
overtime pay for extended working hours. They receive 14 days per year vacation time
and female staff members are given 60 days paid maternity leave. The workers are
offered with free commute to the KIZ. Their health conditions have enhanced as they
have had access to better nutrition. Employers are prohibited from freely punishing
employees and firing incompetent staff. The workers, however, do not enjoy the right to
change employers. The idea is to prevent labor costs from escalating and to let firms
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maintain a stable workforce. This practice, however, goes against the global workers'
rights.
B. Financial Benefits for the Regime
It is important to identify how much the DPRK, a state that has been creating
problems for international security, is taking advantage of the money produced from the
KIZ project. The employee salaries are first delivered in hard currency (dollars) to the
North Korean government, and it deducts some portion (social insurance taxes and a
socio-cultural policy fee) before distributing to the workers. Article 234 of the Labor
Law of the KIZ, however, states that wages must be paid directly to employees in cash.
It is assumed that the government collects approximately $2 million per month from the
staff salaries.128 The other payments also include land lease fees, corporate income tax,
sales of raw materials and other industrial products, and employee recruiting services.
C. Import from and Export to the KIZ
Another critical issue is whether the US and other nations should ban products
that are made in the KIZ. Currently, the US is imposing a sanction on the DPRK due to
its development program of nuclear warhead and weapons of mass destruction. It forbids
the North Korean made goods, services and technology to enter the American border
without approval of the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the Department of the
Treasury. It also disallows merchandise made from a third country that utilized North
Korean products and technology to be brought into the US. The sanction has affected the
recently signed Korea-US Free Trade Agreement and America decided not to recognize
goods made in the KIZ as made in the ROK and therefore the merchandise are not subject
128
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to the benefits of reduced tariffs. Although, the European Union classifies the situation
as a special case of products refined outside the South Korean region and does not
impose tariffs.
In terms of the US exports to the KIZ, the Department of Commerce reviews and
licenses all American exports to the DPRK and the Department of Treasury grants
licenses for certain financial transactions. In 2006, for example, the US Bureau of
Industry and Security approved glass fiber optic transmission items and software to be
shipped to the KIZ and the shipments were used for telecommunication equipment in
setting up the communication lines into the KIZ.129
4. Stakes and Interests
It is crucial to understand the significance of the continuing operation of the KIZ
and the interests of the related parties. First, the ROK believes that the KIZ is a gateway
to the DPRK's reform. More than 50,000 North Koreans come to the KIZ every day and
meet South Koreans. They hear and witness through tools like the Internet that there is a
better world outside. These experiences strengthen their desire for betterment and a
higher life standard. China and the Arab states have changed for this reason and settled
to adopt the new global modernizing system. The South firmly relies on this theory and
that its economic engagement with the North will lead to increased peace and political
cooperation. This was proven true when the ROK government chose not to close down
the KIZ even after the DPRK destroyed a South Korean naval vessel with a torpedo
missile and launched an artillery attack on a South Korean island in 2010.
Second, North Korea regards the KIZ as one of its key sources of income. Simply
put, the complex is a lucrative business. According to a recent study, the DPRK has
129
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earned roughly over $10 billion from the KIZ productions since its opening in 2004.130
The government is aware of the fact that the complex negatively affects its citizens and
could escalate the possibility of an uprising.

The KIZ, however, creates plenty of

revenue for the regime and too much is at stake to discontinue this profitable venture.
Lastly, America and other nations' interests in the KIZ are also quite substantial.
They are first concerned about the economic profit the KIZ produces for the DPRK
government and the possibility that this money is directed towards funding its military
and nuclear program. It is, however, unsure how the income is being spent and there is
no possible method available to discover the country's financial arrangements unless the
government makes this information accessible, which is highly unlikely to occur at least
within the foreseeable future. The international community also values a market-based
economy and representative government. It thinks the KIZ is a great opportunity to bring
changes in North Korea, but at the same time the complex working conditions,
environment regulations, and other humanitarian matters should be par with the
international norms and legal standards. These subjects shall be addressed now and
before the KIZ becomes a larger complex.
5. Recommendations
It is recommended that global policymakers apply the following solutions to
resolve the issues involved in the KIZ project and help expand the business.
- Adjust free trade agreements and allow South Korean companies in the KIZ or firms in
the South that buy the parts made in the complex to receive the benefits of the agreement
and avoid any tariffs when exporting to America. This would encourage more ROK
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corporations to move into the KIZ, which would intensify the chances of a North Korean
reform.
- For the same reason, policymakers should allow a third country to do business with the
ROK companies operating in the KIZ.
- While adjusting the FTA, it should be demanded that the South Korean government to
pay more attention to labor and other conditions in the KIZ.
- Loosen up the sanctions imposed on the DPRK and increase the amount of export from
the KIZ into other nations and foreign export and investment in the KIZ. Request other
countries to do the same.
- Take the necessary steps to resume normal trading relations status with North Korea.
- Ask both China and Russia to set up similar industrial parks in the northern part of the
DPRK, across from their national borders.
- Form a committee, similar to the United Nations Panel of Experts, whose primary duty
is to oversee KIZ issues and progress.
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Chapter VII: Conclusion
After reform takes place in the DPRK, the nation will struggle to form a new
government system. The UN, the ROK, the US, and other nations have to help the nation
implement the right political and legal system. More importantly, however, North Korea
must quickly find ways to enhance its economy and feed over 20 million people.
Immediate reunification with South Korea and reliance on its support should not be
considered as an option. The South economy would suffer tremendously as it was clearly
shown in the German reunification. Most people in the ROK would strongly refuse this
idea. The World Bank (WB), rather, can offer assistance to the North and will play a
vital role in modeling the future of the North Korean economy.
The WB was established at the end of World War II to rehabilitate the
international community.

In the 1970s, its focus shifted towards solving economic

problems of developing countries. Today, the institution has set goals to end extreme
poverty and boost shared prosperity by fostering the income growth of the bottom 40%
for every country.131 Through effective allocation of resources in areas such as education,
health, public administration, infrastructure, financial sector, agriculture, environmental
and natural resource management, the WB seeks to make economic and social progress in
underdeveloped regions of the world.

The members of the Bank are 188 nations,

comprised of the 187 UN member countries and Kosovo. All member states are eligible
to borrow grants and seek consultation from the World Bank. Currently, the DPRK is not
a member and the first step towards enhancing its economy is gaining the WB
membership.
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The Bank operates on a project basis, and the aims of each project should align
with the mission of the institution. Its recent projects were conducted in the Arab Spring
nations. It issued Interim Strategy Note (ISN) to some of these countries such as Tunisia,
Egypt, and Yemen. The ISN delineated strategies for these nations to cope with post
Arab Spring situations involving social and political unrest. The ISN stated that the
organization was especially focusing on (1) solidifying the new governance by increasing
transparency and accountability, (2) building foundation for sustainable economic growth
and jobs creation, and (3) modernizing infrastructure to benefits disadvantaged social
groups such as women, the youth and the poor.132
In Tunisia, the WB initiated thirteen new projects and of these projects, five
projects specifically targeted to aid the political transition. The rest of the projects
concentrated on environment, rural development, human development and water. The
biggest project, totaling in the amount of $1 billion of lending, was put in to the
Governance and Opportunity Development Policy Lending (DPL) Program to fund the
interim government in June 2011 and November 2012.133
In the case of Egypt, the organization has taken up nine projects since the uprising
of total $4.6 billion.134 About $ 200 million was put into the Emergency Labor Intensive
Investment Project and the Youth Employment Project to combat the high unemployment
rate in the youth.135 Financing for the Micro and Small Enterprises Project distributed
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more than 75,000 loans, creating over 100,000 jobs, especially targeting the youth group
between the ages of 21 to 25.136 The Bank also carried out projects aiming at the low
income households. The Natural Gas Connections Project yielded a gas distribution
network to 90,000 low income households, while creating 3,000 jobs in Cairo and Giza.
The expansion of the housing market was realized through creating both supply and
demand. In June 2013, the government built 75,000 new units of housing offered at a
special rate. At the same time, the Mortgage Finance subsidies Program provided 8,400
subsidies to households, which aimed to stimulate the housing market and establish
transparent mortgage programs.
Yemen has one the lowest GDP among the Arabic nations. Yemen also has one
of the highest population growth rates in the world and 45% of the population lives with
food insecurity.137 The poverty rate, which marked 42% in 2009, has risen to 54.5% in
2012 due to the recent political crisis, a part of the Arab Spring movement.138 The WB
has generated twenty new projects since the civilian uprising in 2011 and a total of $317
million has been distributed, following the agreement made at the Yemen Donors
Conference in September 2012. 139 Among these, some projects were implemented to
provide direct relief.

The Emergency Crisis Recovery Project received the largest

amount of loan, a total of $100 million, in which cash benefits were offered to eligible
poor households through Social Welfare Fund program.140 Human development is not an
exception in the Bank’s commitment in Yemen. A total of $66 million was approved for
136
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the Second Basic Education Development Project, which ensured basic education
through building schools and training teachers to promote equal access to quality
educations.

Other ongoing projects, such as Modernization of the Central Bank of

Yemen, aim to rebuild the infrastructure system which is crucial for Yemen to become a
viable economy.
As shown in the cases of Tunisia, Egypt, and Yemen, the WB has resources and
expertise to help a country cope with political and social unrest. The purpose of the Bank
in North Korea should be advancing the living standard of the citizens and to help build a
sustainable economy.

In particular, it should concentrate on the following sectors;

infrastructure, improving healthcare, education, and food security.
With its capital Pyongyang being the only major city in the DPRK, the general
population lives in rural areas with little or no infrastructure. Throughout the nation, the
WB should launch infrastructure building projects that are necessary to live a modern life
such as gas, electricity and waste water system. These projects will be labor intensive
public works that create jobs and provide ground work for a competitive market economy.
At the early stage, the WB should commit to the development of information and
communication infrastructure since the citizens in North Korea have a limited channel of
information to the outside world.

The North will have geographical advantages,

bordering China and Russia towards the North and proximity to South Korea and Japan.
The upgrade and development of transportation systems, such as roads and railways, is
therefore crucial and will not only induce internal growth, but also place North Korea in
an important portal of exchange in northeast Asia.
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For building sustainable communities, the Bank should seek targeted regional
growth. Identification of the unique characteristics and economic resources at a local
level should be conducted as well as implementation that will bring out the maximum
potential of the targeted region. For example, a village built around a mining ore will
need certain types of infrastructure such as a road system to effectively transport the
production. A port city will appreciate expansion and modernization of the port logistics
system to increase traffic capacity. In major farmlands, irrigation system development
and construction of renewable energy sources will ensure increased production and long
term environmental benefits.
Like most underdeveloped countries, a significant ratio of the population suffers
from malnutrition and lack of medical care. Modernization of infrastructure such as
clean water supply and waste system will certainly reduce the future risks. The DPRK
will benefit from interventions and targeted aid programs that will bring the improvement
on the population’s existing state of health. For instance, the critical indicators of health,
maternal and infant mortality rates are especially high in rural areas. As an immediate
relief, the WB can offer various types of assistance such as social welfare program, health
service packages for pregnant women and children and incentives for healthcare
providers, and distribution of vaccines and medical service. As a preventive measure to
health problems and ensure that improvements on the healthcare sector are sustainable,
the institution should take upon projects providing education on basic nutrition, hygiene,
and signs of common illness such as water borne diseases. Programs for training medical
staff, nurses, and midwifery along with strengthening of public healthcare system will
help North Korea in building a reliable and accessible healthcare system. Successful
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delivery of these projects will not only improve the general welfare of the population, but
also strengthen the existing and future labor force.
In the North, educational opportunity is limited to those who are privileged. The
citizens receive basic education, which is concentrated on fostering the political agenda.
Major reform in the primary educational system will be inevitable in the nation,
especially in the time of political transition. The goal of potential projects should be
setting a standard for basic education and ensuring all citizens access for a certain level of
learning experiences. Through projects such as defining school districts, delivery of
educational materials and supplies, training programs for teachers, and creating
incentives for low income parents to send their children to school can be potential
projects supported by the Bank. The community involvement in construction of schools
will also generate jobs. For secondary education, the organization should focus on
preparing the younger generation through offering a system where they can get technical
and vocational training. They will compose a quality labor force that will drive economic
growth.
In 2002, the North Korean government allowed private farmer’s market on an
experimental level to increase agricultural output; however the general population deals
with food insecurity on a daily basis. The WB has several case studies on resolving the
issue and the food security project in the DPRK should aim to achieve modernization of
agricultural industry and reaching out to the most disadvantaged groups.

Subsidies on

fertilizers and seeds will create a short term production boost in supply, while vouchers
and food stamps can be distributed among low income households to create a consumer
base. Projects on the assessment of soil quality, equipment, resources operation and
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management should be conducted. Then, the farmers should receive education and
training for estimating crop yields and preparing for natural disasters. The modernization
of the irrigation system will be also crucial as rural farmlands are especially prone to
drought, which can lead to a famine.
A developed and modernized DPRK brings numerous benefits to the global
community. The world becomes a safer place without North Korean nuclear weapons
and WMDs. Both South and North Korea can reduce military spending and concentrate
on other national agendas. The US and other UN members will be able to withdraw their
troops located in the area. Nations will have another trading partner, and worldwide
corporations will have another market to enter and over 20 million potential customers to
sell their products and services. There will no longer be human rights violations in the
North, and its people and children would be able to have access to food and medical care.
Most significantly, however, a reformed DPRK increases the possibility of reunification.
Many of the movies and television shows in the ROK carry stories of North Korea. This
proves that South Koreans have a great interest in the issue and always think about the
matter in the back of their minds. They feel a great sorrow for not being able to visit their
hometowns and see their family members.

It should be extremely difficult to be

separated with its own people for over sixty years and identify them as an enemy. The
two countries share the same history, ancestors, culture, food, customs, and language.
Since their division in 1948, there have not been too many changes in terms of their
nationality features. They sincerely want this problem to be resolved during their lifetime.
As this thesis finds, the day will come soon. Modern activities will eventually force
North Korean reform. Whether it is initiated by a street vendor, students, social groups,
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or a courageous political leader, this thesis predicts that there will soon be revolutionary
movements in the North. The people may have to make sacrifices, but it is imperative for
the welfare of those living under these repressive conditions and for a united Korea that
these changes take place, and soon, to prevent further suffering.
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